Misplaced Priorities: The Utah Digital
Signature Act and Liability Allocation
in a Public Key Infrastructure*
I. INTRODUCTION

On March 9, 1995, the Utah Digital Signature Act (the "Utah Act")
was signed into law. 1 Complex and ambitious, the Utah Act is intended
to promote the use of digital signatures on computer-based documents
and to facilitate electronic commerce. 2 The Utah Act implements an
infrastructure in which computer users utilize "certification authorities,"
online databases called repositories, and public-key encryption technology in order to "sign" electronic documents in a legally binding fashion.
In addition to setting out a regulatory scheme designed to implement this
infrastructure, the Utah Act provides certain digital signatures with legal
status as valid signatures and addresses a variety of issues relating to the
status of digitally-signed electronic documents in contract and evidence
law.

* B.A. University of California, San Diego; J.D. candidate, University of San
Diego, May 1997. The author will be joining the San Diego office of Cooley God ward,
LLP as an associate upon graduation. This Comment generally reflects developments
through April 8, 1996. Special thanks to my wife Mare for all of her support. This
comment is dedicated to our daughter Sophie, born February 5, 1996, with whom I spent
many late nights pacing the floor and discussing the intricacies of public key
cryptography.
I. The Utah Digital Signature Act was enacted by 1995 Utah S.B. 82, creating
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (Supp. 1995). It was significantly amended by
1996 Utah S.B. 188, which repealed and reenacted large portions of the Act. The Act
is found in its amended fonn at 1996 Utah Laws 46-3-101 to -502 (and will, when
codified, add those sections to the Utah Code). When this Comment cites to a code
section, it is referring to the 1996 amended version of the Act unless otherwise noted.
An account of the history of the Utah Act can be found in DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS
AND COMMERCIAL CODE, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, UTAH DIGITAL
SIGNATURE LAW: TECHNJCALLY AND LEGALLY SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 17-18
(November 1995) (drafting committee's commentary to the now-enacted amended version
of the Utah Act) [hereinafter UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW].
2. § 46-3-102.
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The potential benefits of the "public key infrastructure" implemented
by the Utah Act are considerable. Conceivably, a well-functioning
public key infrastructure could allow private individuals, businesses, and
government to routinely and securely conduct personal, financial, and
legal affairs over open networks like the Internet. 3 Legislation can
potentially facilitate the development of this type of infrastructure. As
the Utah Act illustrates, legislation can clarify the arguably uncertain
legal status of digital signatures, determine liability standards in an
emerging and unprecedented certification authority industry, clarify the
rights and responsibilities of infrastructure participants, and address other
important public policy concerns. In light of the significance of these
issues, it is not surprising that more than ten states are following in
Utah's footsteps and developing digital signature legislation.
As further described in Section IV of this Comment, the Utah Digital
Signature Act has become a putative "Model Act" which other state
legislatures are looking to when developing digital signature legislation.
Thus, it is particularly important to recognize certain policy choices
made by, and certain problems with, the Utah Act. This Comment
analyzes one of these problem areas: the allocation of liability and
evidentiary burdens. 4
The drafters of the Utah Act made policy choices concerning liability
allocation which are troubling. Consumers who participate in the
infrastructure developed under the Utah Act subject themselves to a far
greater risk of extensive liability than they face in a variety of analogous
situations, and face difficult evidentiary burdens in resolving disputes
that arise under the Act. Additionally, the financial responsibility
provisions of the Utah Act create a de facto liability cap for one actor
in the infrastructure, the certification authority, at an amount that could
be significantly less than the actual damages a certification authority
could cause.

3. For a general introduction to the Internet, see ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET
(1992). For a discussion of the advantages of the Internet over value-added networks
(VANs) as a business tool, see Colleen Frye, EDI Users Explore Internet as Tool of
Trade, SOFTWARE MAG., Dec. 1995, at 83 ("lower costs and more freedom are earning
the 'Net a look as a vehicle for business commerce"). For a discussion of the
disadvantages of the Internet relative to V ANs, see BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE EDI E-MAIL AND THE INTERNET: TECHNOLOGY, PROOF, AND
LIABILITY§ ETl.3.5 (2d ed. 1995). See also Internet Commerce Hung Up on Security,
EDI NEWS, Feb. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ZTLI File (noting that
the Internet is "still daunting as a commercial vehicle" because of security concerns).
4. Some other criticisms of the Utah Act are surveyed in note 120, infra. A
number of issues related to a public key infrastructure have recently been addressed in
A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic
Commerce, 75 U. OR. L. REV. 49 (1996).
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This Comment begins by presenting a brief overview of digital
signature technology in Section II (which can be skipped by those
readers already familiar with basic cryptographic techniques without any
significant loss of context). A summary of the Utah Digital Signature
Act follows in Section III. Section IV describes the Utah Digital
Signature Act's status as a putative "Model Act," and suggests that this
status may not be entirely appropriate. In Section V, the focus turns to
a comparison of the liability allocations and evidentiary burdens imposed
by the Utah Act to three analogous models: the credit card model, the
notary model, and the telecommunications toll fraud model. As part of
the discussion of the credit card model, this Comment discusses the
likely preemption of the Utah Act under certain limited circumstances
by the consumer protection-oriented Electronic Fund Transfer Act. 5 An
alternative approach to the apportionment of liability in a public key
infrastructure is proposed, based upon a proposed reform in the
analogous arena of telecommunications toll fraud. Ultimately this
Comment asserts that the liability allocations of the Utah Act inappropriately impose potentially unlimited risk on users of digital signatures,
ignoring an important policy of consumer protection. This Comment
additionally asserts that the provisions of the Utah Act which limit the
liability of certification authorities undermine the economic integrity of
the infrastructure implemented by the Act. Lawmakers contemplating
digital signature legislation should reconsider some of the policy choices
made by the Utah Act.
II.

DIGITAL SIGNATURES

Two preliminary observations are appropriate before exploring the
technology behind digital signatures. First, digital signatures are not
digital images of manually signed names. Rather, as further described
below, the term describes a method of digital file encryption which
facilitates verification of the integrity and authenticity of digital
messages. 6

5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1995).
6. Peter N. Weiss argues that the tenn "digital signature" is misleading in many
ways, particularly because the tenn sparks the inference that legislation is necessary in
order to accommodate the technology into the common law and statutory framework of
written signatures. He notes that an awkward but more accurate description is "public
key-based cryptographic originator authentication." E-mail message from Peter N. Weiss
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Second, from a legal perspective, understanding the underlying
technology of digital signatures is perhaps less important than understanding what using digital signatures can accomplish. If Alice "signs"
an electronic document with a digital signature and sends it via
electronic mail over the Internet to Bob, ideally Bob can be assured that,
first, the document really came from Alice. Forging electronic mail
messages on the Internet is easily accomplished. Digital signatures
provide assurance that a message has in fact come from its purported
sender. This assurance supplied by a digital signature is called "proof
of origin" or "data origin authentication."7 Second, Bob can be sure that
the document he received is the exact document that Alice sent-it has
not been altered since Alice sent it. A message sent over an open
network like the Internet may pass through dozens of computer systems,
each owned and operated by different entities. At every stage in this
process the message is vulnerable to alteration. A digital signature
enables a recipient to verify that a message has not been intentionally or
accidentally altered, a quality known as "message integrity."8 Third,
Bob is assured that Alice cannot later deny that she sent the message (in
order to avoid a promise that she made in the message, for example).
No one but Alice could have sent the message, and Bob can prove it
unequivocally. This quality of digital signatures is known as "nonrepudiation. "9
Achieving the three qualities of data origin authentication, message
integrity, and non-repudiation requires the use of sophisticated cryptographic technology (which can be built into computer software or
hardware) and the use of trusted third parties who can provide certain
to C. Bradford Biddle (February 23, 1996) (printed copy on file with author). See
generally Peter N. Weiss, Security Requirements and Evidentiary Issues in the
Interchange of Electronic Documents: Steps Towards Developing a Security Policy, 12
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 425 (1993).
7. Michael J. Ganley, Digital Signatures and Their Uses, 13 COMPUTERS &
SECURITY 385 (1994). See also BRUCE SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY: How TO KEEP
YOUR ELECTRONIC MESSAGES PRIVATE 98 ( 1995) [hereinafter SCHNEIER, E-MAIL
SECURITY]. SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY is highly recommended as an excellent general
introduction to the fundamentals of cryptography. Another excellent introduction to
cryptography and digital signatures is Paul Fahn, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions
About Today's Cryptography, published by RSA Laboratories, a division of RSA Data
Security, on the Internet in a hypertext version at <http://www.rsa.com/
rsalabs/faq/faq_horne.htrnl> and in an ASCII version at <http://www.rsa.com/pub/faq/
faq.asc> (September 20, 1993) [hereinafter "RSA FAQ"]. This Comment cites to the
section numbers of the RSA FAQ as presented in the ASCII version. A more
sophisticated and comprehensive introduction to cryptography can be found in BRUCE
SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE
IN C (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY].
8. Ganley, supra note 7, at 385.
9. Id.
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identification requirements and other services. The remainder of Section
II discusses the mathematics and technology underlying digital signatures, and the institutional infrastructure that is necessary in order to
make digital signatures work effectively.

A.

Public Key Cryptography

Public key cryptography, developed in 1976, was a profound
breakthrough in the science of cryptography. 10 Prior to the development
of public key cryptography, cryptographers traditionally used secret key
cryptography. Using secret key cryptography, both the sender and
recipient of a message share the same secret piece of information, called
a key, which is used in conjunction with an algorithm to both encrypt
and decrypt (scramble and unscramble) the message. 11 Secret key
cryptography is ill-suited for communications over open computer
networks, because of logistical problems inherent in securely communicating the secret key to a would-be correspondent (particularly challenging if there are many potential correspondents) and a number of other
security-related reasons. 12
Public key cryptography, in contrast, is well-suited for use on open
computer networks. 13 It utilizes two different paired keys: an individual has a "public key," which they make widely available, and a "private
key," which is kept secret. One way that public key cryptography can
be used is to send confidential messages. If Alice wished to send a
message to Bob which only he could read, she would first locate his
public key, which he may have published in a publicly-accessible online

10. See, e.g., SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, supra note 7, at 31 ("In 1976
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman changed the paradigm of cryptography forever.").
Cryptography is the art and science of keeping messages secure; it is practiced by
cryptographers. Id. at I. The process of disguising a message in such a way as to hide
its substance is called encryption; the process of returning the message to its original
form is called decryption. Id. See also RSA FAQ, supra note 7, at § I. I ("Encryption
is the transformation of data into a form unreadable by anyone without a secret
decryption key.").
11. An algorithm is a mathematical formula that describes the scrambling
technique; it does not need to be kept secret. SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY. supra
note 7, at 2 - 3.
12. See SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY, supra note 7, at 41-42; RSA FAQ, supra
note 7, at§ 1.4.
13. See SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY, supra note 7, at 43; RSA FAQ, supra note
7,at§ 1.4
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database. Alice would encrypt the message using his public key (and a
public key algorithm) and send it to him. Bob would decrypt the
message using his private key (and the same public key algorithm).
Once the message was encrypted with Bob's public key, only his private
key could decrypt the message--so if an eavesdropper intercepted it,
they could not read it. Anyone who wanted to send an encrypted
message to Bob could go through the same process, even if they had
never communicated with Bob before. Public key cryptography
eliminates the need for two correspondents to agree upon a secret key. 14
Computer equipment and software utilizing public key cryptography
is sometimes termed an "asymmetric cryptosystem." This term is used
in the Utah Act. 15

B.

Digital Signatures

Digital signatures involve reversing the role of public and private key,
utilizing public key cryptography to achieve goals other than confidentiality. For example, if Alice encrypted the message to Bob using her
private key, Bob could decrypt the message using Alice's public key,
which he might find in a public database. Bob could be assured that

\ 4. Public key cryptography utilizes two components, a set of paired keys and an
algorithm. A number of different public key cryptographic algorithms exist. These
algorithms are proprietary and patentable, and several have been the subject of intense
and acrimonious intellectual property disputes. See The Friendliest of Enemies Shaky

Marriage Between Crypto Firms Shatters Cy/ink, RSA do Battle over Future of
Electronic Commerce, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., Sept. 9, 1994, available in
LEXIS, MARKET Library, JACNWS File; Ugly Till the End Cy/ink Gains Edge in
Crypto Case, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., Sept. 29, I 995; Splitting the Baby,
Again RSA-Cy/ink Arbitrators Revisit Crypto Mess, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP.,
Feb. 9, 1996; SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, supra note 7, at 609-10. Additionally,
they can be implemented in different ways. For example, RSA, the leading public key
algorithm, can be used for encryption (that is, to provide the quality of confidentiality)
as well as to create digital signatures. DSA, a U.S. government endorsed algorithm, can
theoretically only be used to create digital signatures---it cannot be used for encryption.
Thus, a system which utilized the DSA algorithm alone theoretically could not achieve
the quality of confidentiality. See SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY, supra note 7, at 45, 47.
The use of powerful cryptography by private citizens for the purposes of achieving
confidentiality of data messages and files is the source of immense political controversy,
pitting law enforcement officials (who want access to all electronic communications)
against business interests (who chafe at the current export restrictions on cryptography,
see International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120 (1996)) and civil
libertarians. For an excellent summary of the many legal issues implicated in this
debate, see A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995). For additional background
information, visit the Internet sites of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
at <http://www.epic.org> and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) at
<http://www.eff.org>.
15. § 46-3-I03(2).
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Alice sent the message because if the message can be decrypted using
Alice's public key, then it must have been encrypted using her private
key. Thus, Alice and Bob have achieved "data origin authentication."
Digital signatures, as contemplated under the Utah Act, involve
another step: the one-way hash function. A one-way hash function is
a mathematical process that is used to take a message of any length and
create a short, fixed-length "hash" unique to that message, called a
message digest. 16 Each time a message is run through the hash
function it will result in the same value, but no two distinct messages
will return the same value. 17 The hash function is "one way" because
it is virtually impossible to reconstruct the original message using the
message digest. 18
If Alice wants to "sign" an electronic document with a digital
signature and send it to Bob, she does not have to encrypt the entire
document with her private key. Instead, she can run the document
through a one-way hash function, creating a message digest. She can
then encrypt that message digest using her private key and send it along
with the unencrypted document. Note that every digital signature is
unique to the document for which it is created. So a forger could not
take Alice's digital signature from one document, append it to a
fraudulent document, and then successfully claim that Alice had signed
the fraudulent document.
When Bob receives the message, he independently runs the same oneway hash function on the original message to determine what the
message digest should be. He then decrypts (or "verifies") Alice's
digital signature, using Alice's public key. If the message digest in
Alice's decrypted digital signature matches the message digest that Bob
calculated from the message on his own, then Bob knows that the
message is indeed from Alice, and that it has not been altered since she
signed it. If the message digests are not identical, then Bob knows that
Alice did not sign the same message that he received--somehow the
message has been altered. If the message digests are identical, Alice
cannot later successfully claim that she did not send the message. No

16. RSA FAQ, supra note 7, § 8.2.
17. Actually, this is not really true, but "the chances of any two messages hashing
to the same value are minute enough to be negligible." SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY,
supra note 7, at 60.
18. Id. at 59. ("[T]here is no way to go backwards with a one-way hash function.")
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one else could have created the digital signature attached to the
document. Thus Alice and Bob may have achieved the qualities of data
origin authentication, message integrity, and non-repudiation. 19
C.

Certificates and Certification Authorities

Although the procedure followed by Alice and Bob offers the
possibility of achieving data origin authentication, message integrity, and
non-repudiation, they did not actually achieve all of these qualities
because of a fundamental problem in asymmetric cryptosystems:
identification of the sender. Alice may not have sent the message to
Bob at all. Instead, a forger may have generated a key pair and entered
the public key in a public key database under the name "Alice." Bob
may enter into a business arrangement whereby Bob performs some
service for the person he believes to be Alice. When Bob later attempts
to enforce his electronic contract and collect from the real Alice, he will
find that he has been the victim of fraud. Certificates attempt to solve
this problem of identification.
Certificates are digitally-signed electronic documents that attest to the
connection of a public key to an individual (or other entity). 2° Certificates are issued by certification authorities (CAs). The process might
work like this. Alice would generate her public and private key pair. 21
She would then take her public key (on a floppy disk, for example) to
a CA and present some form of identification. The CA would check the
identification and take any other steps necessary to assure itself that
Alice was indeed who she claimed to be. The CA would then give

l 9. Note that Alice and Bob have not achieved confidentiality, a critical security
service. While digital signatures utilize public key cryptography, they do not, by
themselves, provide this quality of confidentiality. Alice can send Bob an unencrypted
(or "plaintext") message with a digital signature attached. This digital signature can
prove that the message in fact came from Alice and that the message has not been
altered. However, someone who intercepted the message could read it, and verify the
digital signature.
20. RSA FAQ, supra note 7, § 3.5.
21. Generating key pairs is not a simple process. One part of the process involves
generating random numbers. Bruce Schneier notes: "If there is a flaw in the algorithm
that generates the random numbers, then that flaw might be exploitable by an adversary
to break the system. This is a tough problem .... Imagine what would happen if the
program didn't do random-number generation correctly. The program might only
generate 10 million public-key/private-key pairs. This would be large enough so that no
two users would have the same key, but small enough for a computer to search them all.
Even though the program used RSA and DES [two powerful cryptographic algorithms],
breaking the system would be easy." SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY, supra note 7, at 51.
Indeed, this problem occurred recently in Netscape's implementation of the RSA
algorithm in their Navigator World Wide Web browsing software. See Steven Levy,
Wisecrackers, WIRED, Mar. I 996, at 128, 200.
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Alice a certificate attesting to the connection between Alice and her
public key. The certificate would contain Alice's name, her public key,
and some other information. The certificate would be signed using the
digital signature of the CA. Thus the certificate could not be altered or
forged.
The CA must also somehow prove that it is bound to its public key,
which is used to verify Alice's certificate. Thus, the CA would have its
own certificate, signed with the digital signature of a "higher level"
certification authority. This higher level certification authority might be
(as under the Utah Act) a government agency. 22
Alice would probably choose to publish this certificate in a publiclyaccessible online database, so that anyone she corresponded with could
verify her digital signature. Thus, when Bob received a message from
Alice signed with Alice's digital signature, he could locate Alice's
certificate in this online database. If the signature on the message could
be verified using the public key listed in the certificate (and if the CA's
signature were verified as well), Bob would know that a CA had
authenticated Alice's identity, and that he was not dealing with someone
else posing as Alice.

D.

Certificate Revocation

Certificates are used to address the problem of identification. Public
key cryptography presents another vexing problem, however: the
security of private keys. If a forger somehow discovers Alice's private
key, that forger can digitally sign Alice's name on documents. If a
forger discovered a certification authority's private key, that forger would

22. The hierarchy of certification authorities envisioned in the Utah Act is rather
"flat" compared to other proposed implementations of a public key infrastructure.
Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM), a draft Internet standard developed by the Privacy and
Security Research Group of the Internet Activities Board, envisions a certification
hierarchy with at least one additional tier. Under PEM, the Internet PCA Registration
Authority (IPRA) serves as the top-level certification authority (the role played by the
Division under the Utah Act). The IPRA certifies Policy Certification Authorities
(PCAs), who in tum certify certification authorities (CAs) who meet each PCAs
particular requirements (different PCAs will have different certification guidelines, i.e.,
some may be "high-assurance," others may be "mid-level assurance," etc.). For a
general overview of the PEM certification framework, see SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY,
supra note 7, at 125-27. A more detailed summary of PEM is found in Steven T. Kent,
Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail, 36:8 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 48 (1993).
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have the means to commit widespread fraud. 23 As a practical matter,
in any large-scale system utilizing public key cryptography some private
keys will become compromised, and the certificate containing the
corresponding public key will need to be revoked. Certificates may have
to be revoked for other reasons as well. 24 Certificate revocation lists
(CRLs) prevent people from relying on a compromised or otherwise
revoked public key/private key pair.
A CRL is a list of public keys that have been revoked prior to their
expiration date. 25 If the private key is compromised, or the key pair is
no longer in use for some other reason, the public key would be placed
on a CRL. Thus, before Bob relied on the electronic message that he
received from Alice, he would check to make sure that Alice's certificate
was not on a CRL. The online database which published public keys
would most likely also maintain a CRL. 26

23. See RSA FAQ, supra note 7, § 3.10 ("A compromised CA key is a ...
dangerous situation. An attacker who discovers a certifying authority's private key can
issue phony certificates in the name of the certifying authority, which would enable
undetectable forgeries; for this reason, all precautions must be taken to prevent
compromise .... ").
24. For example, a person may be issued a certificate which enables them to
digitally sign documents on behalf of their employer in the course of their employment.
If that person leaves their job, their certificate may need to be revoked.
25. Certificates would generally have expiration dates to ensure that the underlying
algorithms could not be "broken" by a long term "attack." See RSA FAQ, supra note
7, § 3. 12.
26. This Comment does not explore the issue further, but note the privacy
implications of CRLs. The online database that maintains a CRL will have access to
valuable transaction-generated information that could expose sensitive relationships
among individuals or businesses. If Company A sends a digitally signed message to
Company B, Company B must verify the digital signature by connecting to a database,
verifying the digital signature and making sure that Company A's certificate is not on
a certificate revocation list. This process, of course, will leave electronic footprints.
Could the manager of the database disclose the fact that A and B were corresponding?
What if A and B were discussing a possible merger or other transaction with significant
consequences in the securities markets? Similarly, could the database disclose to Joe
Whistleblower's defense-contractor employer that Whistleblower was verifying digital
signatures of a reporter from the New York Times? Could the database manager take
note of the fact that subscriber C frequently corresponded with a cardiologist's office,
and sell C's name, address, or other personal information to a drug company interested
in marketing a new drug for heart patients? The Utah Digital Signature Act is totally
silent on this and other privacy issues. Lawmakers contemplating digital signature
legislation could look to the Customer Proprietary Network Information (CPNI)
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 for guidance on how customer
privacy is protected in an analogous context. See Telecommunication Act of 1996, 104
Pub. L. No. 104, § 702, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (creating 47 U.S.C. § 221). See also, e.g.,
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE§ 2891 (West Supp. 1996).
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III.

THE UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE ACT

The Utah Digital Signature Act provides a regulatory scheme for
licensing CAs and certificate databases (termed "recognized repositories"), allocates liability and evidentiary burdens among participants in
the public key infrastructure implemented by the Act, and addresses the
legal status of electronic documents signed with digital signatures created
using licensed CAs. The Act is divided into five parts. A part-by-part
general overview of the Act follows. 27
Part I of the Utah Act sets out the purposes of the Act, general
interpretive instructions, a long list of definitions, and guidelines
concerning the role of the Utah Department of Commerce Division of
Corporations and Corporate Code ("Division") in implementing the Act.
The Act states that its goal is to effectuate the following purposes:
(1) to facilitate commerce by means of reliable electronic messages;
(2) to minimize the incidence of forged digital signatures and fraud
in electronic commerce;
(3) to implement legally the general import of relevant standards,
such as X.509 of the International Telecommunication Union28 ... ; and
(4) to establish, in coordination with multiple states, uniform rules
regarding the authentication and reliability of electronic
messages. 29
After stating the Act's purposes, Part I moves to a comprehensive list
of definitions. The definitions in the Utah Act largely mirror the
definitions presented in the Information Security Committee's Digital
Signature Guidelines, 30 and generally promise to be a useful model for
other legislative efforts, even those that differ from the Utah Act.

27. Some differences between the amended 1996 version of the Act and the 1995
original version are noted. At least one state that is contemplating digital signature
legislation has modeled its proposed statute after the original 1995 version of the Utah
Act. See 1995 Haw. Sess. Laws 203.
28. X.509 is a standard format for certificates. It was developed by the
International Telecommunications Union (then known as the International Consultative
Committee on Telephony and Telegraphy and abbreviated as "CCITT") in 1988, and
amendments were proposed in late 1995. See RSA FAQ, supra note 7, § 3.5.
29. § 46-3-102.
30. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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Part I also describes the role of the Division, an entity similar to the
Secretary of State's office in many other states. 31 The commentary to
the relevant provision of the Act describes the Division's role as follows:
As a certification authority, the Division's role should be limited, in the main,
to ( 1) spawning other certification authorities, who ... do most of the work of
issuing certificates to the private sector, (2) enabling licensed certification
authorities within state government to act as certification authorities, and (3)
serving users within the Division itself . . . . For the private sector, the
Division could essentially be a "prime mover" in issuing certificates, issuing
only as many certificates as needed to start the mainly private-sector digital
signature infrastructure functioning ....
The principal role of the Division lies, not in acting as a certification
authority in its own right, but rather in policy making, facilitating implementation of digital signature technology as needed, and regulatory oversight. 32

In addition to serving as a top-level certification authority, the Division
has broad rulemaking authority. 33 Among other things, the Division is
authorized to assure the financial responsibility of CAs by "determin[ing]
an amount appropriate for a suitable guaranty, in light of: (i) the burden
a suitable guaranty places upon licensed certification authorities; and (ii)
the assurance of financial responsibility it provides to persons who rely
on certificates issued by licensed certification authorities." 34 A suitable
guaranty is either a surety bond or an irrevocable letter of credit that
meets certain administrative specifications35 and is designed to facilitate
collection of any judgment obtained against a CA. The Act states that
"[a] suitable guaranty may also provide that the total annual liability on
the guaranty to all persons making claims based on it may not exceed
the face amount of the guaranty." 36 Financial institutions acting as
certification authorities are exempted from the requirement of posting a
suitable guaranty. 37
In addition to addressing the suitable guaranty issue in rulemaking
proceedings, the Division is authorized to "review software for use in
creating digital signatures and publish reports concerning software." 38
The Division is also authorized to make rules concerning the form of

31. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 34.
32. Id. at 36.
33. § 46-3-104(3).
34. § 46-3-104(3)(b).
35. § 46-3-103(33)(a).
36. § 46-3-103(33)(b).
37. § 46-3-103(33)(c).
38. § 46-3-104(3)(c). The 1995 version of the Act empowered the Division to
"approve asymmetric cryptosystems for use in signing certificates issued by licensed
certification authorities," and to issue rules addressing the "suitability of algorithms for
use in fulfilling the requirements of this chapter." 1995 Utah Laws 46-3-501(4), 46-3501 (5)(c).
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certificates, record-keeping requirements for certification authorities, and
the form and content of certification authority disclosure records
(publicly-accessible documents which detail certain specified practices
of certification authorities), and to promulgate other rules necessary to
effectuate the Act. 39
Part II of the Act turns to the licensing and regulation of certification
authorities. The Act sets out minimum qualifications that a certification
authority must meet in order to obtain a license. Licensing is voluntary;
unlicensed CAs can operate in the state. Among a number of other
requirements (such as providing a suitable guaranty, "employ[ing] as
operative personnel only persons who have demonstrated knowledge and
proficiency in following the requirements of this chapter," and being the
subscriber of a certificate published in a recognized repository), licensed
certification authorities must "have the right to use a trustworthy system,
including a secure means for controlling usage of its private key."40
"Trustworthy system" is defined as computer hardware and software
which (a) are reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse; (b) provide
a reasonable level of availability, reliability, and correct operation; and
(c) are reasonably suited to performing their intended functions. 41 The
1995 Utah Act limited the availability of certification authority licenses
to Utah-licensed attorneys, financial institutions, title and escrow
companies, and certain public entities. 42 The 1996 amendments
dropped these restrictions.
The Division is empowered to issue restricted licenses under certain
circumstances. 43 The Division may also revoke or suspend a CA's

39. § 46-3-104(3).
40. § 46-3-201(1).
41. § 46-3-103(37).
42. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201 (Supp. 1995) (repealed 1996). See also
Memorandum from Alan Asay to the Digital Signature Legislative Facilitation
Committee, Aug. 26, 1994 (recommending that licensed CAs be limited to Utah State
Bar members in good standing or their law firms, financial institutions, insurance
companies, and title companies, because of the prospect of unscrupulous behavior by a
CA) (copy on file with author).
43. The Division may issue restricted licenses classified according to specified
limitations such as a maximum number of outstanding certificates, cumulative maximum
of recommended reliance limits in certificates issued by the certification authority, or
issuance only within a certain firm or organization. § 46-3-201(3).
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license for failure to comply with the requirements of the Act, including
failure to maintain the minimum qualifications specified in the Act. 44
The Division may, by administrative rule, recognize CAs licensed or
authorized by other governmental entities, "provided that those licensing
or authorization requirements are substantially similar to those of this
state."45 If the Division recognizes the licensing of a CA by another
governmental entity, Part IV of the Utah Act (which establishes certain
presumptions for adjudicating disputes involving digital signatures and
details the legal effects of digital signatures created through the use of
licensed CAs) and certain liability limitations granted to licensed CAs in
Part III of the Act both apply in the same fashion to the out-of-state
licensed CA as they apply to Utah-licensed certification authorities. 46
These provisions explicitly do not apply to digital signatures created
using unlicensed CAs. 47
Performance audits are also described in Part II of the Utah Act.
Licensed CAs are required to have annual performance audits of their
operations, performed by a certified public accountant having expertise
in computer security or an accredited computer security professional
(additional qualifications for auditors may be specified by Division
rule). 48 Exemptions are allowed under certain circumstances. 49
Part II lastly describes the enforcement powers of the Division. The
Division can investigate the activities of licensed CAs and issue orders
designed to further its investigation and secure compliance with the
requirements of the Act. 5° Civil penalties can be assessed for violations
of the Act committed knowingly or intentionally, up to $5,000 per
violation or 90% of the "recommended reliance limit" of a material

44. § 46-3-201 (4). This section requires that revocation or suspension of licensure
must take place in accordance with the procedures for adjudicative proceedings
prescribed by Utah's Administrative Procedures Act, codified at UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 63-46b-0.5 to -22 (1993).
45. § 46-3-201(5).
46. Id.
47. § 46-3-201(6). Concerning unlicensed certification authorities, the commentary
to this portion of the Act notes:
[A] digital signature may be effective, enforceable, and valid even though it
is verified only by a certificate issued by an unlicensed certification authority.
This Act does not preclude the application of other laws for determining what
constitutes a signature; a mark such as a digital signature may be a valid
signature under law other than this Act . . . . A certification authority who
chooses to operate in this state without a license would undertake greater risk
of liability ....
UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 39.
48. § 46-3-202(1).
49. § 46-3-202(3).
50. § 46-3-203(1 ).
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certificate, whichever is less. 51 The Division is also empowered to
"issue orders and obtain injunctions or other civil relief' against any
certification authority, licensed or unlicensed, which is conducting its
business in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of loss to
subscribers of that certification authority, or to a repository. 52
Part III of the Utah Digital Signature Act turns to the duties of
certification authorities and subscribers (persons utilizing the services of
a CA). CAs are required to use trustworthy systems, 53 and are required
to disclose the practices they employ in issuing certificates, upon specific
request and payment of reasonable compensation. 54
Prior to issuing a certificate to a subscriber, a certification authority
must satisfy several conditions. Along with several other technical
requirements, the Act requires that the CA must confirm that:
(i) the prospective subscriber is the person to be listed in the
certificate to be issued;
(ii) if the prospective subscriber is acting through one or more
agents, the subscriber authorized the agent or agents to have
custody of the subscriber's private key;
(iii) the information in the certificate to be issued is accurate; and
(iv) the prospective subscriber rightfully holds the private key55

51. § 46-3-203(3). "Recommended reliance limit" is a monetary amount. § 46-3103(28). By specifying a recommended reliance limit is a certificate, the issuing CA and
the accepting subscriber recommend that persons rely on the certificate only to the extent
that the total amount at risk does not exceed the recommended reliance limit. § 46-3309(1 ).
52. § 46-3-204(!) and (3). This Comment does not explore the issue further, but
the grant of authority to act against unlicensed certification authorities is rather
remarkable. As discussed very briefly in note 14, supra, encryption technology has
sparked very heated political controversy. One phenomenon that fueled this controversy
was the release and subsequent widespread adoption of a powerful encryption program,
"Pretty Good Privacy" (PGP), on the Internet. PGP users act as certification authorities
for other PGP users, establishing a non-hierarchical "web of trust" certification scheme
that is very different from the certification hierarchy implemented by the Utah Act. See
generally SIMSON L. GARFINKEL, PGP: PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY (1995). Use of powerful
encryption like PGP is generally disfavored by law enforcement officials. Would these
provisions of the Utah Act allow a zealous official to take legal action against a
particular PGP user/"certification authority" under the ostensible rationale that PGP's
"web of trust" certification scheme inherently creates unreasonable risk?
53. § 46-3-301(1).
54. § 46-3-301(2).
55. '"Rightfully hold a private key' means to be able to utilize a private key: (a)
which the holder or the holder's agents have not disclosed to any person ... ; and (b)
which the holder has not obtained through theft, deceit, eavesdropping, or other unlawful
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corresponding to the public key to be listed in the certificate. 56
These requirements cannot be waived or disclaimed by either the CA or
a subscriber. 57
By issuing a certificate, a CA makes certain warranties to the
subscriber named in the certificate. These include warranting that the
certificate contains no information known to the CA to be false, and
warranting that the certificate "satisfies all material requirements"
imposed by the Act. 58 The CA cannot disclaim or limit these warranties.59 The Act also imposes ongoing obligations to the subscriber on
the CA, which can be altered by contrary agreement. The CA is
obligated to promptly suspend or revoke a certificate when specified
conditions are satisfied, and is obligated to notify the subscriber of any
facts which significantly affect the validity or reliability of the subscriber's certificate after it is issued. 60 By issuing a certificate, a CA
certifies to all who reasonably rely on it that, among other things, the
information in the certificate is accurate and that the subscriber has
accepted the certificate. 61
Accepting a certificate imposes duties on a subscriber. By accepting
a certificate issued by a licensed CA, a subscriber certifies to all who
reasonably rely on the certificate that the subscriber rightfully holds the
private key corresponding to the public key listed in the certificate, and
that all representations made by the subscriber to the CA or otherwise
incorporated into the certificate are true. 62 Agents or purported agents
who accept a certificate on behalf of a principal personally certify that
they have legal authority to act on behalf of the principal, and that
adequate safeguards exist to prevent the agent from exceeding the
bounds of any limitations on that agent's ability to sign digitally on
behalf of the principal. 63 Accepting a certificate imposes indemnification obligations on a subscriber:
By accepting a certificate, a subscriber undertakes to indemnify the issuing
certification authority for any loss or damage caused by issuance or publication
of a certificate in reliance on:
(a) a false and material representation of fact by the subscriber; or
(b) the failure of the subscriber to disclose a material fact;

means."§ 46-3-103(31).
56. § 46-3-302(l)(b).
57. § 46-3-302(l)(c).
58. § 46-3-303(l)(a) and (b).
59. § 46-3-303(1).
60. § 46-3-303(2).
61. § 46-3-303(4).
62. § 46-3-304(1 ).
63. § 46-3-304(2).
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if the representation or failure to disclose was made either with intent to
deceive the certification authority or a person relying on a certificate, or
with negligence. . . . The indemnity provided in this subsection may not
be disclaimed or contractually limited in scope ....64

By accepting a certificate, a subscriber assumes a duty to exercise
reasonable care to retain control of the private key corresponding to the
public key listed in the certificate, and to prevent its disclosure to any
person not authorized to create the subscriber's digital signature. 65 A
private key is deemed to be the personal property of the subscriber who
rightfully holds it. 66 A CA who holds a subscriber's private key does
so as a fiduciary, and may use the private key only with the subscriber's
express permission. 67
CAs are required to publish certificates which they have issued in a
recognized repository68 unless a contract between a subscriber and the
CA provides otherwise. 69 After issuing a certificate, a CA can suspend
or revoke it under certain conditions, including upon the subscriber's
request. 70 Likewise, the Division can order a CA to revoke or suspend
a certificate if certain conditions are met, including compliance with the
Administrative Procedures Act by the Division. 71 Notice of suspension
or revocation must be "immediately" published in a recognized
repository specified in the certificate. 72 While a particular certificate
is suspended, a subscriber is released from the duty to keep the relevant
private key secure. 73 Upon notice of revocation, a subscriber is

64. § 46-3-304(4).
65. § 46-3-305( 1). The commentary to this portion of the Utah Act offers three
alternative standards of care for holders of private keys: strict liability, diligence, and
"negligence for consumers; diligence for others." UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra
note I, at 50. Some of the drafters of the Utah Act originally advocated a strict liability
standard for breach of the duty to safeguard a subscriber's private key. See Memorandum
from Alan Asay to the Digital Signature Legislative Facilitation Committee, Aug. 24,
1994 (recommending strict liability standard) (copy on file with author).
66. § 46-3-305(2).
67. § 46-3-305(3).
68. Repositories are on-line databases of certificates available for retrieval and use
in verifying digital signatures. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 13.
Recognized repositories are repositories recognized by the Division pursuant to § 46-3501. § 46-3-103(27).
69. § 46-3-302(2).
70. §§ 46-3-302(4), -306, -307.
71. § 46-3-302(5).
72. §§ 46-3-306(3), -307(5).
73. § 46-3-306(7).
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released from the duty to keep the private key secure and from the other
duties imposed by the acceptance of a certificate.74 Revocation also
releases a CA from its warranties and representations. 75 These duties
are also discharged upon the expiration of a certificate; all certificates
are required to have an expiration date. 76
Liability limits for licensed CAs are detailed. The Act provides that,
unless waived by the CA, a CA shall:
(a)

(b)

(c)

not be liable for any loss caused by reliance on a false or forged digital
signature of a subscriber, if, with respect to the false or forged digital
signature, the certification authority complied with all material
requirements of [the Act];
not be liable in excess of the amount specified in the certificate as its
recommended reliance limit for either:
(i)
a loss caused by reliance on a misrepresentation in the
certificate of any fact that the licensed certification authority
is required to confirm; or
(ii)
failure to comply with section 30277 in issuing the certificate;
be liable only for direct, compensatory damages in any action to
recover a loss due to reliance on the certificate. Direct compensatory
damages do not include:
(i)
punitive or exemplary damages;
(ii)
damages for lost profits, savings\ or opportunity; or
(iii)
damages for pain and suffering.'

Part III lastly provides rules for collection upon a suitable guaranty.
A claimant may recover the full amount of a "qualified right to
payment" against the surety bond or letter of credit serving as the
suitable guaranty. 79 A qualified right to payment means an award of
damages against a licensed CA by a court having jurisdiction over the
CA in a civil action for violation of the Act. 80 In addition to the
amount of the qualified right to payment, a claimant can recover
reasonable attorney's fees and court costs from the suitable guaranty. 81
The total liability on the suitable guaranty to all persons making
qualified rights of payment or recovering attorney's fees during its term
cannot exceed the amount of the suitable guaranty. 82 Interpleader
techniques will assist in equitably distributing the proceeds of a suitable

74. § 46-3-307(6).
75. § 46-3-307(7).
76. § 46-3-308(1) to (2).
77. § 46-3-302 details the requirements that must be met prior to a CA issuing a
certificate to a subscriber.
78. § 46-3-309(2).
79. § 46-3-310(1).
80. § 46-3-103(25).
81. § 46-3-310(2).
82. § 46-3-310(1) to 46-3-310(2).
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guaranty to multiple claimants whose claims exceed the amount of the
guaranty. 83

Part IV of the Act addresses the effect of a digital signature. A digital
signature is deemed to satisfy legal signature requirements if:
( 1)
(2)
(3)

that digital signature is verified by reference to the public key listed
in a valid certificate issued by a licensed certification authority;
that digital signature was affixed by the signer with the intention of
signing the message; and
the recipient has no knowledge or notice that the signer either:
(a)
breached a duty as a subscriber; or
(b)
does not rightfull.( hold the private key used to affix the
digital signature. 8

Language in the Act and in the accompanying commentary emphasizes
that the Act is not designed to preclude other symbols or marks from
being valid as a signature under other applicable law. "An unverified
digital signature or other symbol may be treated as a signature, if, in the
words of the Uniform Commercial Code§ 1-201(39), it is 'executed or
adopted by a party with the present intention to authenticate a writing. "'85 The Act is designed to "appl[y] only to the digital signatures
described within it, and ... simply does not pertain to the validity of
other symbols as signatures."86
If reliance on a digital signature is "not reasonable under the
circumstances," the recipient of that digital signature assumes the risk
that digital signature is forged. 87 A recipient of a digital signature can
determine not to rely on an unreliable signature and must promptly
notify the signer of that decision. 88
The Act states that electronic documents signed with a valid digital
signature created using a licensed CA are "written" as required by the
statute of frauds. 89 Additionally, a copy of a digitally signed message
is "as effective, valid, and enforceable as the original of the message,"
thus satisfying the best evidence rule. 90

83. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note 1, at 60.
84. § 46-3-401.
85. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note 1, at 61.
86. Id.
87. § 46-3-402.
88. § 46-3-402.
89. § 46-3-403; UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note 1, at 64.
90. § 46-3-404. This section contains an exception for originals intended to be
unique, such as negotiable instruments. See UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note
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The Act provides that a certificate issued by a licensed CA is an
acknowledgment of a digital signature verified by reference to the public
key listed in the certificate.91 Thus, among other things, digitally
signed documents are deemed to be "acknowledged" and self-authenticating and are therefore prima facie admissible evidence under rule
902(8) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (identical to rule 902(8) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence). 92
Presumptions for adjudicating disputes are set out in the Act as
follows:
In adjudicating a dispute involving a digital signature, a court of this state
shall presume that:
(I) A certificate digitally signed by a licensed certification authority and
either published in a recognized repository or made available by the
issuing certification authority or by the subscriber listed in the
certificate is issued by the certification authority which digitally signed
it and is accepted by the subscriber listed in it;
(2) The information listed in a valid certificate ... and confirmed by a
licensed certification authority issuing the certificate is accurate;
(3) If a digital signature is verified by the public key listed in a valid
certificate issued by a licensed certification authority:
(a)
that digital signature is the digital signature of the subscriber listed in that certificate;
(b)
that digital signature was affixed by the signer" with the
intention of signing the message; and
(c)
the recipient of that digital signature has no knowledge or
notice that the signer:
(i)
breached a duty as a subscriber; or
(ii)
does not rightfully hold the private key used to
affix the digital signature; and
(4) A digital signature was created before it was timestamped by a
disinterested person utilizing a trustworthy system. 94

The commentary to this section of the Act claims that "[t]he effect of the
presumptions provided in this section is merely to allocate the burden of

1, at 65.
91. § 46-3-405.
92. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note !, at 66-67.
93. As drafted by Utah Digital Signature Legislative Facilitation Committee the
1996 amendments to the Utah Act used the words "that subscriber" rather than "the
signer." See UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note 1, at 68. Presumably the Utah
legislature did not intend to substantively alter the meaning of this section by this
eleventh-hour change (an assumption that is buttressed by reading subsection 3(b) in
conjunction with subsection 3(a)). Rather, the legislature probably made the change in
order to echo the language in § 46-3-401, which establishes the legal status of digital
signatures. At least one other state that has followed the Utah Act model has retained
the original language, "that subscriber." See S. 6423, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 406
(Wash. 1995).
94. § 46-3-406.
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going forward with allegations and evidence to the party challenging the
digital signature, the certificate, or the trustworthy time-stamp. "95
Part V of the Act concerns repositories. The Division is required to
recognize one or more repositories. 96 A recognized repository must be
operated by a licensed CA and provide access to a database containing
certificates published by the repository, notices of suspended or revoked
certificates, certification authority disclosure records for licensed CAs,
and other information specified by the Division. 97 Procedures for
recognition of repositories are set out in the Act98 and in accompanying
regulations. 99
The liability of recognized repositories is limited by the Act. Unless
waived, a recognized repository, or the owner or operator of a recognized repository, is not liable for failure to record suspension or
revocation of a certificate unless more than one business day elapsed
after notice was received. 100 However, the repository may be held
liable for any loss of a person who relied on a revoked or suspended
certificate----up to the amount of the recommended reliance limit on the
relevant certificate and including only direct compensatory damages and
not punitive damages or lost profits, savings, or opportunity-if the
repository failed to publish notice of suspension or revocation of a
certificate more than one business day after receiving notice. 101
Repositories are not liable for misrepresentation in a certificate published
by a licensed certification authority. 102 Nor are they liable for publishing information which the Division requires them to publish. 103

95. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note l, at 69. As discussed in Section
V of this Comment, however, the Act may impose a greater evidentiary burden than
suggested in the commentary. A time-stamp is a digitally-signed notation appended or
attached to a message which indicates, at least, the date and time when the notation was
created and the identity of the person creating the notation. § 46-3-103(36). Reliable
time-stamps are essential to maintain the validity of electronic documents over many
years. RSA FAQ, supra note 7, § 3.18.
96. § 46-3-501 (2).
97. §§ 46-3-501(2)(a) to -501(2)(b).
98. § 46-3-501(2).
99. UTAH ADMIN. R. 146-10-401 (1996).
100. § 46-3-502(2)(a).
101. § 46-3-502( 1) - (2).
102. § 46-3-502(2)(a)(iii)).
103. § 46-3-502(2)(a)(v).
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IV.

THE UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE ACT AS
PUTATIVE "MODEL ACT"

The Utah Digital Signature Act was developed in collaboration with
the Information Security Committee of the Section of Science and
Technology of the American Bar Association (the "Information Security
Committee"). 104 The Information Security Committee, which endorsed
the Utah Act "in principle," 105 planned to release a Model Digital
Signature Act in June of 1995. 106 The release of this draft model
legislation has been delayed indefinitely. One report credits "bureaucratic maneuvering" for the delay, describing the frustration of Information
Security Committee members over the postponement of the release of
their Model Act. 107 The Information Security Committee had been
developing model legislation for three years. Committee member's
frustration reportedly was compounded by the specter of rapidly
accelerating state legislative activity concerning digital signatures,
proceeding without the guidance of the Information Security Committee's
model legislation. 108
In the absence of model legislation from the Information Security
Committee, a number of states turned to the Utah Act as model digital
signature legislation, a process encouraged by the drafters of the Utah
legislation. 109 In several public communications, a prominent Informa-

104. UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 18.
I 05. Resolution of the Information Security Committee, Section of Science and
Technology, American Bar Association (November 9, 1994) (copy on file with author).
I 06. E-mail message from Michael S. Baum, Chair of the Information Security
Committee, Section of Science and Technology, American Bar Association, to the <cadigsig@commerce.net> Internet mailing list (May 6, 1995) (printed copy on file with
author).
I 07. Digital Signature Maven Bye Bye Baum ABA EDI and Information Technology
Division Head Resigns, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., Oct. 13, 1995, available in
LEXIS, MARKET Library, IACNWS File ("the ABA's work at providing states with a
draft bill has been stymied by bureaucratic maneuvering").
I 08. ABA Model Law on Digital Signature on Hold, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES
REP., Sept. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, MARKET Library, IACNWS File ("The delay
has angered some members of the Information Security Committee who fear that state
legislative action is moving too fast for the ABA to have much influence.");
109. See, e.g.,§ 46-3-102(4) (one of the purposes of the Utah Act is to establish,
in coordination with other states, uniform rules for digital signatures). See also UTAH
DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 25 (noting that one of the purposes for
publishing the commentary is to provide guidance for other states considering digital
signature legislation). The Utah Department of Commerce, Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code formed an "interjurisdictional group" which held at least one
"discussion meeting." Among the suggested topics at this meeting was "What should we
do to facilitate this new approach to commerce?" Proposed Agenda for Discussion
Meeting on Interstate Cooperation Regarding Digital Signatures (undated) (copy on file
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tion Security Committee member who was also involved in the drafting
of the Utah Act indicated that the "U.S. Model Digital Signature Act"
under development by the Information Security Committee was
substantively identical to the Utah Digital Signature Act. 110 At its
September 19, 1995 meeting, the Utah's Digital Signature Legislative
Facilitation Committee, the ad hoc committee which drafted the Utah
Act, discussed the delay in the release of the Information Security
Committee's Model Act. The minutes of the meeting note that, "despite
efforts by the ABA or NCCUSL, 111 the perception held by many states
is that Utah's Act is the Model Act. Therefore, it was determined that
Utah's interest, and the interests of other jurisdictions, require amending
the Utah Act in conformity with the work of the ABA Committee." 112
The explanation for the delay of the Information Security Committee's
model legislation appears to be more complex than simply "bureaucratic
maneuvering," and the picture painted by the proponents of the Utah Act
as a model act may be misleading. One Committee member has
indicated that the primary reason for the lack of a legislative recommendation from the Information Security Committee was that a "majority"
of the committee believed "digital signature legislation like Utah's is

with author); Letter from George Danielson, Digital Signature Coordinator, Utah
Department of Commerce, to C. Bradford Biddle (February 14, 1996) (describing this
group as the "interjurisdictional group") (on file with author). See also § 46-3-201(5)
(providing that the Utah Department of Commerce Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code can recognize certification authorities licensed or authorized by
another state if the licensing or authorization requirements of the other state are
"substantially similar" to those of Utah).
110. Alan Asay was the principal drafter of the Utah Act and also served as a
Reporter for the Information Security Committee's effort. In an e-mail message to Barry
Fraser of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Asay wrote: "The Act adopted in Utah and
under consideration in other states is about to be published, with some revision and for
comment, as the Model Digital Signature Act by the American Bar Association's
Information Security Committee." E-mail message from Alan Asay (April 29, 1995)
(printed copy on file with author). In an e-mail message to the "ca-digsig" mailing list,
Asay wrote that he expected the proposed amendments to the Utah Act (since enacted)
to "largely if not entirely conform the Act as it now stands to the ABA ISC's US Model
Digital Signature Act." E-mail message from Alan Asay to the <cadigsig@commerce.net> mailing list (May 6, 1995) (printed copy on file with author.)
111. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See infra note
I 14.
112. Minutes of the Utah Digital Signatures [sic] Act, Legislation Facilitation
Committee (September 19, 1995) (on file with author).
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simply unnecessary." 113 Michael Baum, Chair of the Information
Security Committee, has noted that the committee's decision not to
proceed with model legislation was the result of a number of legitimate
factors, including "a probable lack of consensus [among committee
members] on a single legislative approach ...." 114
In spite of some resistance to the Utah approach within the Information Security Committee and elsewhere, a number of states are moving
forward with digital signature legislation modeled upon the Utah Act.
By April of 1996, at least nine states had passed or had actively
considered digital signature legislation. 115 Five of these states (Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, and Washington) were considering or
had enacted bills directly modeled after the Utah Act. 116 California
enacted a different, narrower form of digital signature legislation in
1995, and a bill modeled after this legislation was introduced in Rhode
Island in 1996. Legislation in Floridall 7 and Virginia focused primarily on studying the issue of digital signature legislation and reporting
findings to the legislature.
On October 5, 1995, the Information Security Committee released an
exposure draft of its Digital Signature Guidelines, which it described as
"general, abstract statements of principle, intended to serve as long-term,
113. E-mail message from Peter N. Weiss, Information Security Committee member,
to C. Bradford Biddle (Febmary 23, 1996) (printed copy on file with author).
114. E-mail message from Michael Baum to the <ca-digsig@commerce.net> mailing
list (Febmary 21, 1996) (printed copy on file with author). Baum's message noted that
our decision not to proceed with model legislation was the result of many
legitimate factors, including (l) notice from the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to our section that they are considering
the possibility of drafting model legislation (and the ABA's agreement with the
Commissioners to coordinate such matters), (2) the fact that our committee has
not yet had the time to rigorously consider and debate legislative issues and
approaches ... , (3) our committee's legitimate focus on the completion of the
draft Digital Signature Guidelines (the current focus of considerable effort),
and (4) a probable lack of consensus on a single legislative approach at this
time.
115. See H.R. 2444, 42nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1996); A. 1577, ch. 594 (Cal.
I995); H.R. l 023 (Fla. 1996); S. 942 (Fla. 1996); S. 736, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1995); H.R.
1256, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1995); S.R. 621, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1995); S. 2401, 18th Leg. (Haw.
1995); S. 939, 1996 Sess. (Mich. 1995); G.A. 8125, Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1995); H.R.J. Res.
195 (Va. 1996); S. 5959, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1995); S. 6423, 54th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 1995).
116. Washington enacted 1995 Senate Bill 6423 on March 29, 1996. 1995
Washington Senate Bill 5959 died. The Oregon legislation died in committee in 1995.
1996 Arizona House Bill 2444 was enacted on April 18, 1996, but amendments caused
it to no longer follow the Utah model. 1995 Georgia Senate Bill 736 died in committee
on March 8, 1996. 1995 Hawaii Senate Bill 2401 was enacted on June 17, 1996. The
other legislation was pending as of this writing.
117. Florida enacted digital signature legislation that differs both from the Utah
model and from California's approach on May 25, 1996. S. 942 (Fla. 1996).
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unifying foundations for digital signature law across varying legal
settings." 118 The Guidelines, while comprehensive, are not intended
to serve as model legislation, and they avoid taking positions on many
critical issues that legislation in this area must address. 119

V.

CRITICISM OF THE UTAH ACT

The remainder of this Comment focuses on one problem area for the
Utah Digital Signature Act: the allocation of liability and evidentiary
burdens. 120 Under the Utah Digital Signature Act, users of digital
118. INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL
SIGNATURE GUIDELINES 20 (Draft, October 5, 1995) [Hereinafter DRAFT DIGITAL
SIGNATURE GUIDELINES]. On August I, I 996 the Information Security Committee
released the final version of these guidelines. INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES: LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES AND SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1996).
119. See, e.g., DRAFT DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note I 18, § 4.3.2
(noting that the Guidelines are "intentionally silent" on the duty of care required of
holders of private keys).
120. There are many other aspects of the Utah Act that deserve critical analysis but
will not be discussed here. A thoughtful criticism of public key cryptography generally
can be found in WRIGHT, supra note 3, § ETl.2. The provisions of the Act relating to
the legal status of electronic documents have been criticized as unnecessary and
potentially dangerous, in that they arguably unsettle what is already a fairly well-settled
body of law. See generally Peter N. Weiss, Security Requirements and Evidentiary Issues

in the Interchange ofElectronic Documents: Steps Toward Developing a Security Policy,
I 2 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 425 ( I 993) (arguing that current law can
accommodate electronic documents created and maintained in adequately secure
environments). The costs associated with legislative endorsement of one particular
technology (public-key encryption technology, or, more narrowly, specific implementations of this technology) and whether this endorsement will affect the development of
alternative solutions to the problems posed by communications over open computer
networks deserve consideration. A wide variety of approaches to electronic commerce
have developed without government intervention; perhaps current law and market forces
can solve the problems posed by the Internet without ambitious new legislation. See, e.g.,
WRIGHT, supra note 3, § ET! .3.2 (describing the online payment system of First Virtual
Holdings, Inc.), § ET3. l (describing Mondex electronic cash), § ET3.2 (describing First
Bank of the Internet), and Appendix G (describing the Pen-Op system of capturing
handwritten signatures electronically). See also The Quick Tour; A Summary of
Approaches; Electronic Commerce Industry Overview, RELEASE 1.0, Jan. 24, I 995, at
6. There are other cost-related issues: the institutional overhead associated with creating
and maintaining the Act's infrastructure will be passed along to participants, and
participants must have access to expensive computer hardware and software in order to
participate in the system. The Utah Act does not address the question of whether
citizens who are unable to afford these costs should be provided with subsidized or
reduced-cost access to the infrastructure. Universal service provisions in telecommunications law may prove instructive.
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signatures are held to a standard of reasonable care in preventing
disclosure of their private encryption key. 121 In contrast to the carefully articulated duties the Act requires of certification authorities, the Utah
Act is virtually silent when it comes to determining what constitutes
reasonable care on the part of subscribers in safeguarding their private
keys. Thus, this issue of what constitutes reasonable care will be shaped
by the expensive and often inelegant process of court decisions gradually
determining a standard. In the long run, a sensible, workable standard
may emerge from this process. In the meantime, however, this lack of
a clear standard could lead to inconsistent decisions by courts struggling
to understand a complex, emerging technology, and lead to inequitable
results for those unable to marshal the considerable resources necessary
to make complicated, technology-based arguments before a tribunal
which may be ill-equipped to understand the relevant issues.
The problems with the ill-defined standard of care imposed on
subscribers in safeguarding private keys are compounded by the
evidentiary presumptions imposed by the Utah Act. In adjudicating
disputes involving digital signatures, the Utah Act instructs courts to
presume (among other things) that if a digital signature is verified by the
public key listed in a valid certificate issued by a licensed certification
authority, (i) the subscriber has accepted the corresponding certificate
(and thus assumed the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the
relevant private key), (ii) the digital signature is the digital signature of
the subscriber listed in the certificate, and (iii) the digital signature was
affixed with the intention of signing the message. 122 Thus, if a
subscriber is defrauded by a criminal who somehow obtains that
subscriber's private key and uses it to commit fraud, the subscriber must
come to court with evidence which rebuts this presumption. That is, the
subscriber challenging a fraudulent digital signature must come to court
with evidence showing that they in fact did not affix the digital signature
in question, and that they exercised reasonable care in protecting their
private key. Moreover, it appears that under Utah law this presumption
shifts to the subscriber not only the burden of producing prima facie
evidence to rebut the presumption, but also the burden of persuading the
finder of fact that the presumed facts are not true. 123 Indeed, because
121. § 46-3-305(1).
122. § 46-3-406(3).
123. Utah law distinguishes between presumptions which shift the burden of
persuasion on an issue and those which shift only the burden of making a prima facie
case on the matter. See, e.g., In re Swan's Estate, 293 P.2d 682 (Utah 1956) (some
presumptions are not eliminated upon the introduction of prima facie evidence but have
the effect of placing on the disfavored party the burden of persuading the factfinder that
the facts are contrary to the presumed facts). See generally William E. Shipley,
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digitally signed documents are considered acknowledged documents
under the Utah Act, the burden may be an onerous one. Clear and
convincing evidence is generally required of the party asserting the
invalidity of an acknowledgment; a mere preponderance of the evidence
is not sufficient. 124
To illustrate the difficulties that the allocations of liability and
evidentiary burdens under the Utah Act pose for subscribers who utilize
digital signatures under the Act, consider the following hypothetical,
adapted from an example provided by the drafters of the Utah Act: 125
Cedric, a licensed certification authority, duly issues a certificate to Susan,
who accepts it. Cedric publishes the certificate in a recognized repository.
Susan's private key, which corresponds to the public key in the certificate, is
kept on a floppy disk. Irving, a malicious computer hacker, releases a computer
virus on the Internet that finds its way onto Susan's computer. Subsequently
when Susan uses her private key, the virus program surreptitiously sends a copy
of Susan's private key to Irving. Irving immediately uses the private key to
cash a $ I 0,000 electronic check drawn upon Susan's account payable to a
numbered, anonymous account in a state having rigorous bank secrecy laws.
Irving disappears and cannot be found. As soon as Susan learns of the fraud
she revokes her certificate.

Annotation, Effect of Presumption as Evidence or Upon Burden of Proof. Where
Controverting Evidence is Introduced, 5 A.L.R.3d 19 (1966). Whether or not a
presumption falls into one category or another is a complicated question of law, and an
analysis of whether the presumptions of the Utah Act would, by themselves, shift the
evidentiary burden will not be attempted here. The issue is likely moot because of the
"acknowledged document" status the Utah Act provides digitally-signed documents.
Regardless of whether the presumptions alone would shift the evidentiary burden to a
subscriber, because digitally-signed documents are acknowledged under the Utah Act a
subscriber attacking the validity of a digitally-signed document bears a substantial
evidentiary burden. See note 124, infra, and accompanying text.
124. I AM. JUR. 2D Acknowledgments § 84 ( 1994). This issue is discussed in Part
V(B), infra.
125. Adapted from an illustration provided in UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW,
supra note I, at 91-92. The illustration provided therein had Irving stealing a floppy
disk containing Susan's private key from Susan's purse. It is interesting to note that none
of the illustrations provided by the drafters of the Utah Act include the scenario where
a private key is captured by a computer virus, even though the Digital Signature
Legislative Facilitation Committee considered this possibility. In a memo to the
Committee, Alan Asay wrote, in the context of discussing a CA's private key: "if the
certification authority's system security has been breached without the certification
authority's knowledge (such as by a virus that has compromised the certification
authority's private key), the certification authority must revoke." Memorandum from
Alan Asay to the Digital Signature Legislative Facilitation Committee, Sept. 23, 1994
(copy on file with author.)
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According to the analysis of this scenario provided by the drafters of the
Utah Act, under the Act Susan will be liable for the loss caused by the
forgery if she failed to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding her
private key. 126 The Act provides no guidance as to whether the failure
to protect one's computer from a virus constitutes a breach of the duty
of reasonable care. Thus, Susan must obtain the services of an attorney
well-versed in computer technology and go to court. Susan must
overcome the presumption that the electronic check signed with her
digital signature is valid and binding upon her. The electronic check
will have the status of an acknowledged document, so clear and
convincing evidence is required to challenge its validity. Susan must
show that in fact she did not affix the digital signature in question.
Furthermore, she must show that she did not breach her duty of care in
allowing Irving, the criminal, to obtain her private key. If Susan is
unsuccessful after this time-consuming and expensive process, then
Susan will bear the $10,000 loss.
The allocations of liability and evidentiary burdens imposed by the
Utah Act put users of digital signatures who are victimized by fraud in
a position that is disadvantageous compared to several analogous
situations. Consumers who participate in the infrastructure developed
under the Utah Act subject themselves to a far greater risk of liability
than they face in other electronic transactions, such as credit card or
debit card transactions. The liability allocations and evidentiary burdens
of the Utah Act contradict the spirit, and in certain circumstances (such
as the example of Susan and Irving, supra) the letter, of consumerprotection statutes such as the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) 127
and the Truth in Lending Act. 128 Moreover, a defrauded consumer
challenging the practice of a certification authority in court faces more
difficult evidentiary burdens than a defrauded consumer challenging the
practice of a notary. The liability allocations and burdens of proof
imposed by the Utah Act most closely resemble the law relating to
telecommunications "toll fraud," which itself has been highly controversial. A comparison follows of the liability provisions of the Utah Act
to these three analogous models, the "credit card model," the "notary
model," and the "toll fraud model." Proposed reforms in the arena of
toll fraud suggest an alternative liability allocation scheme that would
more effectively protect the interests of all participants in a public key

126.
127.
128.
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system and promote the development of a robust public key infrastructure. 129

A.

The "Credit Card Model"

A comparison of the liability allocations and evidentiary burdens of
the Utah Act to the liability provisions of two federal consumer
protection statutes, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and the Truth in
Lending Act, proves instructive. The virtually identical liability schemes
of these two Acts will be termed the "credit card model," at the risk of
being somewhat misleading. The combined scope of these two Acts is
much broader than just credit card transactions, but for the purposes of
comparison with the Utah Act, the focus will be on the provisions of
these Acts which address consumer liability in credit card-like electronic
transactions. An analysis of this legislation demonstrates, first, that
some transactions using digital signatures will fall under the purview of
at least the EFTA, and the liability scheme of the Utah Act will be
preempted for a certain narrow class of transactions. More broadly, the

I 29. The potential magnitude of the fraud problem in the context of a public key
infrastructure is completely unknown. In other contexts the fraud problem is enormous.
In 1994 Mastercard reported a loss of $486 million due to credit card fraud; Visa's fraud
loss was $645 million. Robert Jennings, Fraud is Stealing Holiday Joy from Credit Card
Companies, AM. BANKER, Dec. 7, 1995, at I. The number of consumers who are
victims of "true name fraud" or "identity theft" has been skyrocketing. In I 993, the
credit reporting agency Trans-Union received an average of 300 calls per month to their
fraud line set up for victimized consumers; by February of 1996 they were receiving
I 200 calls per day. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 25, I 996). According
to AT&T, telecommunications toll fraud costs American businesses $2 billion annually.
Carriers, PBX Makers, Customers Debate Toll Fraud Responsibility, REP. ON AT&T,
Feb. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ZTLI File. Phone companies
estimate that they lose about $3 billion to calling card fraud and other types of fraud.
Peter Sinton, Visa Has Sights Set on Credit Card Fraud, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 14, 1994,
at BI. Interestingly, the preventative efforts of at least one group of telecommunications
companies, the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) or "Baby Bells," have
been directed "almost exclusively" at calling card fraud, even though this type of fraud
represents only I 2 percent to I 5 percent of overall phone fraud. Local Te/cos Slow
Joining Industry Fight Against Phone Fraud, TELCO Bus. REP., May 22, 1995, available
in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NWLTRS File. See also Local Phone Companies Found to
be Apathetic Toward Security, 12 COMM. DAILY I, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
NWLTRS File. As mentioned in note 132, infra, under the Truth in Lending Act,
consumer liability for calling card fraud is generally capped at $50, and thus the RBOCs
bear a substantial portion of the losses caused by calling card fraud. However,
customers are strictly liable for other types of telecommunications fraud, as discussed
in Part V(C), infra, and the RBOCs bear virtually no risk of loss for this kind of fraud.
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EFTA and the Truth in Lending Act demonstrate a strong federal policy
in favor of consumer protection which the Utah Act simply ignores.
This analysis is not intended to assert that the liability allocations of the
EFTA and Truth in Lending Act necessarily should govern in a public
key infrastructure. Indeed, as explored further below, some differences
exist between the credit card model and a public key infrastructure
which may justify different liability rules.
Certain transactions utilizing digital signatures will likely be governed
by the liability rules of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act. Consumers'
rights in this class of transactions contrast sharply with the rights that the
Utah Act provides to consumers in transactions that are not preempted
by the EFTA. To illustrate the potential applicability of the EFTA to
transactions utilizing digital signatures, reconsider the hypothetical
involving Susan and Irving, introduced supra. According to the analysis
provided by the drafters of the Utah Act, Susan will likely be liable for
the loss caused by the forgery if she failed to exercise reasonable care
in safeguarding her private key. While this may be true as far as the
Utah Act goes, this analysis fails to consider the applicability of the
EFTA, which, under this scenario, would likely preempt the Utah Act
and limit Susan's liability to $50 and impose the bulk of the loss upon
the financial institution, as well as shift the burden of proof in any
dispute away from Susan and onto the financial institution.
The EFTA was enacted for the purpose of providing a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants
in electronic fund transfer systems, and its primary objective is the
provision of individual consumer rights. 130 Electronic fund transfer is
defined in the EFTA as "any transfer of funds, other than a transaction
originated by check, draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated
through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer ...
so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or
credit an account."rn The EFTA limits a consumer's liability for
unauthorized electronic fund transfers to, in most cases, $50. 132 The
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(b) (1994). See also 12 C.F.R. § 205.l(b) (1996). The
purposes of the EFTA are to be carried out by regulations prescribed by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(a) (1994). The
regulations adopted by the Board are known as "Regulation E" and are found at 12 CFR
205.1 to .14 (1996).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (1994).
132. A consumer's liability for an unauthorized electronic fund transfer is capped
at the lesser of $50 or the aggregate amount of unauthorized transfers occurring prior
to the time that the consumer gives notice to the financial institution, unless the
consumer I) fails to report unauthorized transfers appearing on a periodic statement
within 60 days (absent extenuating circumstances), or 2) fails to report loss or theft of
a card or other means of account access within two business days (absent extenuating
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liability limits of the EFTA apply if the "access device used for the
unauthorized electronic funds transfer is an accepted access device." 133
An "access device" is defined as a "card, code, or other means of access
to a consumers account, or any combination thereof, that may be used
by the consumer for the purpose of initiating electronic funds transfers."134 It is an "accepted access device" when the consumer to
whom the access device was issued "[r]equests and receives ... or uses
... the access device for the purpose of transferring money between
accounts or obtaining money, property, labor, or services." 135 In any
action which involves a consumer's liability for an unauthorized fund
transfer, the burden of proof is on the financial institution to establish
that the conditions set forth in the EFTA, which allow application of the
EFTA's liability provisions, are met. 136
The applicability of the EFTA in the Susan/Irving scenario may tum
upon the question of whether the technology used to affix a digital
signature constitutes an "access device." Significantly, the Information
Security Committee's Digital Signature Guidelines assert that it does not:
A private key, as defined in these Guidelines, is not an "access device" within
the meaning of 12 C.F.R. § 205(2)(a)(l) (1994) (Regulation E of the Board of

circumstances), in which case liability is capped at the lesser of $500 or the amount of
actual loss. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g (1994). The provisions in the Truth in Lending Act that
concern credit cards address liability issues in largely the same fashion. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1643 ( 1994). The EFT A was strongly influenced by the Truth in Lending Act. See
Roland E. Brandel & Eustace A. Olliff III, The Electronic Fund Transfer Act: A Primer,
40 Omo ST. L.J. 531, 537 (1979) (noting that the EFTA "borrows concepts and
techniques for legal control" from the Truth in Lending Act, as well as from other
legislation such as the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ l666-66j (1994), and the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-168lt (1994)). One difference in the
liability provisions of the Truth in Lending Act and the EFTA is that the Truth in
Lending Act caps consumer liability in all circumstances at $50. As under the EFT A,
under the Truth in Lending Act a card holder's negligence is irrelevant to the issue of
liability, and the card issuer bears the burden of proof on authorization. 15 U.S.C.
§ !643(b)(l 994). In addition to applying to traditional credit cards, the Truth in Lending
Act's liability provisions apply to utility credit cards, such as those supplied by a phone
company and used to procure telecommunications services. See, e.g., Chartways
Technologies, Inc. v. AT&T Communications, 6 F.C.C.R. 2852, 2954 (1991). Thus,
when a customer's calling card is used fraudulently, that customer's liability is limited
to $50. The Truth in Lending Act does not apply to the type of telecommunications toll
fraud discussed infra, Section V(C).
133. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(a)(l) (1996).
134. 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(l) (1996).
135. 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(2)(i) (1996).
136. 15 U.S.C. § l693g(2)(b) (1994).
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Governors of the Federal Reserve System), but rather, a private key is a device
for creating a digital signature, which satisfies a requirement of a signature as
provided in Guideline 5.1 [which states that legal signature requirements are
satisfied by a digital signature which meets certain specifications]. Therefore,
loss of a private key is not governed by the provisions of Regulation E
concerning the loss of an access device, see 12 C.F.R 205.6 (1994) [which,
amon other things, limits consumer liability for unauthorized fund transfers]. 67

This assertion is ultimately unpersuasive, however. The plain language
of the EFTA's "access device" definition would include many forms of
digital signature technology, although perhaps not literally the private
encryption key itself. In the Susan/Irving scenario, Susan stored her
private key on a floppy disk. An alternative method for storing a private
key would be on a credit card-like "smart card." In either case, the disk
or card and the information stored on the disk or card would appear to
fall within the realm of a "card, code, or other means of access to a
consumers account, or any combination thereof, that may be used by the
consumer for the purpose of initiating electronic funds transfers." In a
1994 work analyzing the possible implementation of a federal certification authority (FCA), Michael Baum, who chairs the committee which
issued the Digital Signature Guidelines, discusses the potential applicability of the EFTA to digital signature technology under certain
circumstances. Baum describes how "the FCA may issue certificates, or
FCA-users may hold their private keys and/or create digital signatures
using a card technology in a form analogous to traditional credit, debit,
or automated teller machine ('ATM') cards." 138 Baum cites an interview with a U.S. Treasury Department representative who notes that "[i]f
the FCA is implemented using card technologies, [portions of] such card
usage would probably be interpreted as coming under the purview of
Reg. E." 139 Baum's proposals concerning an FCA assume the noninvolvement of consumers, "[b]ecause of the added complexity and risks
typically imposed on the providers of consumer products and services."140 Addressing the larger policy issue, Baum notes that

137. DRAFT DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 118, § 4.3.5.
138. MICHAEL S. BAUM, FEDERAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY LIABILITY AND
POLICY 262 (1994). This 388 page (plus appendix), extensively footnoted book provides
a comprehensive survey of the wide array of legal issues implicated by a proposed
federal certification authority, and is highly recommended as a resource for anyone
interested in the legal issues surrounding the implementation of a public key infrastructure. It is published by the U.S. Department of Commerce's National Technical
Infom1ation Service as Report No. PB94-191202.
139. Id. at 267.
140. Id. at 18.
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consumer protection legislation in the payment systems area can be viewed as
a means for consumers to deal with organizations, systems, and processes that
are somehow 'beyond' them. To the extent that the establishment of the FCA
would constitute a radical departure from existing practices, similar protections
may be appropriate for even sophisticated business concerns. 141

The argument that the EFTA would preempt the Utah Act and apply
to some transactions which use digital signatures is buttressed by the
broad consumer-protection mandate the law provides the Federal Reserve
Board. This broad mandate also highlights the importance of the
consumer-protection policy which underlies the Electronic Fund Transfer
Act. The EFTA confers broad authority 142 on the Board to prescribe
regulations to further the EFTA's primary objective of providing
individual consumer rights. 143 The Board's authority is a function of
whether funds transfers are initiated electronically, whether current laws
provide adequate consumer safeguards, and whether coverage under the
EFTA is necessary to achieve the EFTA's basic objectives. 144 Congress contemplated that, as no person can foresee electronic fund transfer
developments, "regulations would keep pace with new services and
assure that the [EFTA's] basic protections continue to apply." 145 Thus,
in "the event that electronic fund transfer services are made available to
consumers by a person other than a financial institution holding a
consumer's account, the Board shall by regulation assure that the
disclosures, protections, responsibilities, and remedies created by this
title are made applicable to such persons and services." 146
In the absence of new regulations from the Federal Reserve Board,
however, many types of transactions that would utilize digital signatures
would fall well outside the purview of the EFTA. The EFTA thus does
not comprehensively replace the liability allocations of the Utah Act
through preemption. The EFTA would not be applicable to any

141. Id. at 239.
142. "This provision (15 U.S.C. § 1693b(c), which defines some duties of the
Board] is virtually identical to section I 05 of the Truth in Lending Act, a provision
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as granting the Board great discretion
in defining coverage. The Court consistently has recognized the Congress' delegation
of broad authority to the Board." 58 Fed. Reg. 8714, 8715-16 (1993).
143. 15 U.S.C. § l693(b) (1994).
144. 58 Fed. Reg. 8714, 8715 (1993).
145. S. REP. No. 95-915, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9403, 9412.
146. 15 U.S.C. § l693b(4)(d) (1994).
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transaction not involving a "consumer" and a "financial institution." 147
Digital signatures could be used for many activities other than electronic
fund transfers, such as signing contracts or filing legal documents. If a
particular fraudulent transaction utilizing digital signatures involves a
consumer, a financial institution, and an electronic fund transfer, the
EFTA will dramatically limit the consumer's liability and place the
burden of proof in any consequent dispute upon the financial institution.
If a consumer is victimized in a fraudulent transaction which does not
include an electronic fund transfer, or which does not involve a financial
institution, the Utah Act's liability scheme will apply and that consumer
will be subject to potentially unlimited liability unless that consumer can
prove that they in fact did not affix the digital signature in question, and
that they exercised reasonable care in protecting their private key. Even
assuming that the liability scheme imposed by the Utah Act is more
appropriate than that of the EFTA because of unique problems posed by
digital signature technology, the interaction of the Utah Act and the
EFTA will create, in addition to a complex and confusing legal
landscape for consumers, a skewed certification authority industry. That
is, financial institutions, which would otherwise be likely candidates for
the role of certification authority and frequent users of digitally-signed
electronic documents, would face dramatically different litigation costs
and liability exposure than other entities involved in the Utah Act's
digital signature scheme.
Digital signature technology does involve some unique risks, and the
credit card model embodied in the EFTA and in the Truth in Lending
Act does not provide a perfect fit as a model for liability allocation in
a public key infrastructure. The credit card model differs from a public
key infrastructure in at least two important ways. First, the consequences of consumer negligence in a public key infrastructure are arguably
more significant than the consequences of consumer negligence in the
credit card model. The success of a public key infrastructure depends
upon the security of private keys. If consumers faced a maximum
liability of $50 for unauthorized transactions which utilized their private
key, a "moral hazard" problem is created. 148 That is, consumers may
lack the financial incentive to take adequate steps to keep their private

147. The term "consumer" means natural person. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(5) (1994). The
term "financial institution" means a State or National bank, a State or Federal savings
and loan association, a mutual savings bank, a State or Federal credit union, or any other
person who, directly or indirectly holds an account belonging to a consumer. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693a(8) (1994).
148. See generally READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 2 (Victor P.
Goldberg ed., 1989).
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key secure, and may in fact have the incentive to commit fraudulent acts.
Of course, this same problem exists under the credit card model as
well. 149 Proponents of heightened liability in the digital signature
context argue that virtually the only way that fraud involving digital
signatures can occur is if a holder of a private key somehow discloses
it, 150 whereas fraud in the credit card context can occur in a number
of different ways, including many that involve no fault on the part of the
credit card holder. This argument is partly flawed. 151 Nonetheless, the
general point that the security of private keys is critical to the functioning of a public key infrastructure is true, and this fact may justify some
differing treatment of consumers in a digital signature context in contrast
to the credit card model. It is not clear, however, that this difference
justifies the extensive liability exposure that the Utah Act imposes on
consumers in contrast to the liability policies embodied in the EFTA and
the Truth in Lending Act.
A second way in which the credit card model diverges from the reality
of a public key infrastructure concerns the availability of a "deep
pocket" entity able to act as a de facto insurer. Under the credit card
model, financial institutions absorb the costs of fraud and redistribute
these costs to all of their customers in the form of higher fees, higher
interest rates, per-use charges to merchants, and the like. In a public key
infrastructure, certification authorities could conceivably play this role.
However, unlike financial institutions, certification authorities may not
be able to limit their liability exposure by accepting as customers only
those who the CA determined were credit-worthy. Moreover, while the

149. In the credit card context this problem, to the degree that it is one, is mitigated
somewhat by the extensive costs imposed upon victimized consumers apart from the $50
liability cap (which is, in practice, often waived). Consumers who are fraud victims
must expend considerable time and effort correcting erroneous information on credit
reports, filing police reports, etc. See, e.g., Marcia Vickers, Stop, Thief! And Give Me
Back My Name, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1996, § 3, l. See also PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE, COPING WITH IDENTITY THEFT: WHAT TO 00 WHEN AN IMPOSTOR
STRIKES ( I 996) (pamphlet produced by San Diego, CA-based consumer group). In light
of the difficulties victimized consumers face, consumers have considerable incentive to
keep their credit cards secure.
150. "[A] person is quite powerless to prevent forgery of her paper signature, but,
in all but rare instances, only a subscriber can prevent the most likely cause forged
digital signatures, by keeping the private key safe." UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW,
supra note I, at 20.
151. See the discussion concerning the implementation of public key cryptographic
algorithms in Part V(C).
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recommended reliance limit on a certificate would limit the CAs'
liability in any single transaction, no analogy to the credit card limits
imposed by financial institutions exists for transactions involving
certificates and digital signatures. Nor would CAs profit from each
transaction in which a subscriber engaged, as financial institutions do
with credit cards. Many transactions utilizing digital signatures may not
be financial transactions at all. Additionally, the kinds of fraud that
occur under the credit card model can often best be prevented by
vigilance on the part of the financial institution (that is, the financial
institution is often the "cheapest cost avoider" 152), whereas in a public
key infrastructure the holder of a private key, rather than the certification
authority, is arguably best positioned to prevent many types of fraud.
In sum, the liability model embodied in the EFTA and in the Truth in
Lending Act may not translate effectively to the realm of digital
signatures. There are two important lessons to be learned from these
consumer protection statutes, however. First, regardless of whether its
policies are better or worse than the very different liability policies of
the Utah Digital Signature Act, the EFTA will apply on its own force to
certain kinds of transactions which utilize digital signatures, thus
undermining the comprehensiveness of the Utah Act's liability scheme.
Second, the EFTA and the Truth in Lending Act illustrate a wideranging federal policy in favor of consumer protection. The Utah Act
ignores consumer protection as an important policy consideration. By
doing so, it not only opens itself up to broader federal preemption, but
also undermines its ostensible goal of promoting the development of a
public key infrastructure. Consumers will not utilize a system which
subjects them to potentially unlimited liability.

B.

The Notary Model

Notaries Public provide a model for liability allocation and allocation
of evidentiary burdens that can be instructively contrasted to the scheme
set out in the Utah Act. Some of the activities performed by certification authorities are analogous to the activities of notaries. The critical
function of a certification authority in a public key infrastructure is to
correctly identify a potential subscriber and issue a certificate which
assures others of the subscriber's identity. Likewise, in witnessing or
attesting a signature, the acquisition of evidence that the subscriber is

152.
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who he or she purports to be is an essential part of the full and faithful
execution of a notary's duty. 153
The "notary model" appears to have been a model which was actively
contemplated by the drafters of the Utah Act. Some of the terminology
used in the Utah Act is similar to language used to describe various
elements of notarial practice. The person who appears before a notary
is a "subscriber." 154 Notarial acts must be evidenced by a "certificate"
signed and dated by a notarial officer. 155 The Utah Act imposes
record-keeping requirements on certification authorities that are not
unlike those typically imposed on notaries. 156 The bonding requirements imposed on CAs by the Utah Act are similar to the bonding
requirements commanded of notaries. 157 Under the Utah Act documents signed with certain digital signatures are given a legal status
similar to that of notarized documents. 158
In taking and certifying an acknowledgment, notaries are required to
act with the care and diligence that reasonably prudent and cautious
persons exercise under like circumstances. 159 That is, notaries are held
to a negligence standard. Thus, a notary is liable to all persons who
have been defrauded of money as a result of relying upon the genuineness of a document executed by the notary in performance of his or her
official duties. However, a notary is not a guarantor or an insurer, and
if the notary is to be held liable at all, it must be on the ground of
negligence (or intentional wrongdoing). 160
In an action to recover against a notary for failure to adequately
perform required duties, generally the burden is on the plaintiff to prove
the notary's negligence and show the consequent harm. 161 However,
if the duty breached is the notary's duty to exercise reasonable care in
153.
154.

58 AM.
Id.

}UR.

2D Notaries Public§ 32 (1989).

155. UNIFORM LAW ON NOTARIAL ACTS § 7(a), 14 U.L.A. 136 (1982).
156. Compare UTAH ADMIN. R. 154-10-303 ( 1996) (regulations prescribing recordkeeping practices of certification authorities) with 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notaries Public § 40
( 1989) (record keeping requirements of notaries).
157. Compare Utah Act§§ 46-3-103(34)(a), -104(3)(b) and UTAH ADMIN. R. 15410-201 (1996) (provisions relating to a certification authority's suitable guaranty) with
58 AM. JUR. 2D Notaries Public§ 74 (1989) (describing liability ofa surety on a bond
issued for a notary).
158. § 46-3-405.
159. I AM. JUR. 2D Acknowledgments§ 117 (1994).
160. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notaries Public § 58 (1989).
161. Id. § 60.
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establishing a subscriber's identity when taking an acknowledgment, the
evidentiary burden shifts to the notary to establish that the proper
standard of care was exercised once a plaintiff establishes that the
acknowledged signature is forged. 162 Shifting the burden of persuasion
to the notary once forgery has been determined is justified by the
probability that the notary was negligent in ascertaining the identity of
the forger and by the strong public interest in ensuring the accuracy of
notarial certifications. 163
The Utah Digital Signature Act imposes a standard of care on
certification authorities that is similar to the negligence standard imposed
on notaries, but with some significant qualifications. The Utah Act
provides that certification authorities shall not be liable "for any loss
caused by reliance on a false or forged digital signature of a subscriber,
if, with respect to the false or forged digital signature, the certification
authority complied with all the material requirements of this chapter. "164 That is, the certification authority who complies with the
duties articulated elsewhere in the Act enters a "safe harbor," sheltered
from any risk of liability. The requirements imposed elsewhere in the
Act are, in many instances, similar to the duties required of a notary
under a negligence standard. For example, a certification authority must
confirm the identity of prospective subscribers 165 and confirm that the
information in a certificate to be issued is accurate, 166 as well as
engage in other, unique duties such as ensuring that a prospective
subscriber holds a private key capable of creating a digital signature. 167
In contrast to the more amorphous negligence standard imposed on
notaries, the question of whether a certification authority has satisfied a
required duty can usually be answered by a "bright line" test.
The notary model shifts the burden of persuasion in a dispute over a
forged acknowledgment or signature once the forgery has been shown.
That is, once a plaintiff shows that a signature is forged, the burden
shifts to the notary to prove that the notary exercised the proper standard
of care. The Utah Digital Signature Act contains no similar provision.
Thus, a person challenging the practice of a certification authority faces

I 62. Id. § 66. Similarly, where the failure of a notary's identification of a subscriber
is established, and consequently the falsity of the notary certificate, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the notary to show a deception perpetrated through no lack of
reasonable care. Id.
163. Id.
I 64. § 46-3-309(2)(A).
165. § 46-3-302(b)(i).
166. § 46-3-302(b)(iii).
167. § 46-3-302(b)(v).
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much more difficult evidentiary burdens than a person challenging the
practice of a notary.
A proponent of the scheme embodied in the Utah Act might argue that
this sort of burden-shifting would be inappropriate in the digital
signature context in light of the policies behind burden-shifting in the
notary model: the probability that the notary was negligent is ascertaining the identity of the forger and the strong public policy of ensuring the
accuracy of notarial certifications. These policies arguably carry less
force when applied to certification authorities. Fraud can easily occur
in the absence of negligence on the part of the CA because, for example,
a criminal could discover a subscriber's private key long after a CA
dutifully identified that subscriber and issued a certificate, and therefore,
placing this burden on a CA does not further the policy of ensuring
accurate certifications. This argument most effectively makes a much
broader point, however: the notary model is not a useful model to apply
to a public key infrastructure.
The activities of a certification authority and a notary are fundamentally different, despite superficial similarities. Both the certification
authority and the notary engage in a process of identification. The
activities of a notary, however, focus on a particular instrument or
transaction. A person appears before a notary, document in hand. The
notary confirms this person's identity, and issues a written certificate that
states that the person who executed the instrument to which the
certificate is attached was known to, and appeared before, the notary and
acknowledged the instrument to be his or her voluntary act. 168 The
acknowledged instrument is then generally admissible into evidence
without further proof of its execution, and the burden is upon the person
challenging its contents to prove his contention by clear and convincing
evidence. Evidence must be "clearly cogent and convincing beyond any
reasonable controversy" in order to impeach a notary's certificate. 169
A subscriber generally appears before a certification authority once.
The CA identifies the subscriber and issues that subscriber a certificate
containing the public key which corresponds to the private key retained
by that subscriber. Subsequently, a subscriber can produce an unlimited
number of electronic documents, all of which will be verified by the
same original certificate. The Utah Act states:
168.
I 69.

I AM. JUR. 2D Acknowledgments § I (1994).
58 AM. JUR. 2D Notaries Public § 43 (1989).
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[A] certificate issued by a licensed certification authority is an acknowledgment
of a digital signature verified by reference to the public key listed in the
certificate, regardless of whether words of an express acknowledgment appear
with the digital signature or whether the signer physically appeared before the
certification authority when the digital signature was created, if that digital
signature is: (I) verifiable by that certificate; and (2) affixed when that
certificate was valid. 170

Thus, documents signed with digital signatures are acknowledged
documents. The commentary to this portion of the Utah Act notes the
applicability of Utah Code section 78-25-7, which states that "the
certificate of ... acknowledgment ... is prima facie evidence of the
execution of [a] writing." 171 The annotations accompanying this
statute indicate that the effect of a certificate of acknowledgment "will
not be overthrown upon a mere preponderance of the evidence," but
rather "the evidence must be clear and convincing." 172 Thus, despite
the fact that documents are not certified individually in the personal
presence of a notary as they are under the notary model, all instruments
signed with digital signatures are acknowledged documents and achieve
a difficult-to-challenge legal status. The notary model is taken too far.
Digitally-signed documents do not achieve the same assurances of
genuineness that documents signed in the personal presence of a notary
achieve, and should not be given the same legal status. Providing
digitally-signed documents with this status creates unreasonable
evidentiary burdens for victims of fraud challenging the validity of
electronic documents signed with the victim's private key.
C.

The Telecommunications Toll Fraud Model

The liability allocations and evidentiary burdens imposed by the Utah
Act perhaps most closely resemble the law concerning telecommunications toll fraud. Toll fraud entails a third party "hacker" gaining remote
access to a private branch exchange (PBX) 173 and placing unauthorized

170. § 46-3-405.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-25-7 (l 992).
171.
172. Id. (citing Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692 (Utah
l 952)).
173. A PBX is comprised of sophisticated switching equipment which allows
businesses with many employee telephones to have station-to-station dialing, direct
dialing to each station from outside the business premises, and a single directory number
for the business - all without the need to route calls through an attendant. CHARLES H.
KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 24 (1994). In the
telecommunications lexicon, PBXs are one type of Customer Premises Equipment (CPE).
Thus the type of fraud under discussion is sometimes termed CPE fraud.
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long distance calls that are billed to the owner of the system. 174 The
magnitude of the resulting fraud can be enormous. For example, the
non-profit San Ysidro Health Center, which serves a low-income
clientele near the Mexican border just south of San Diego, received a
bill for $82,000 in fraudulent calls. 175 AT&T sued San Ysidro Health
Center to compel payment of this bill. 176 Under the law applicable to
telecommunications toll fraud, calls "originate" at a customer's number
when calls, authorized or not, are made from that customer's telephone
system. 177 Customers from whose number a call originates are strictly
liable for that call, regardless of whether the call was placed fraudulently_ 11s
Advocates of this system of liability argue that the customer is the
party with the ability to prevent fraud from occurring, and thus imposing
liability on the customer creates incentives to minimize fraud. The PBX
owner has primary care, custody, and control of the PBX equipment, and
thus can best take preventative steps to eliminate fraud. 179 This
liability scheme and its underlying rationale have proven controversial.
One commentator notes that "[f]ew telecommunications issues in recent
years have created more concern ... than the PBX toll fraud problem_,,1so
Critics of the PBX toll fraud liability scheme point out that other
parties, in addition to the PBX owner, are well-positioned to prevent
fraud. Long distance companies can take steps to prevent fraud. One
company that suffered $300,000 in toll fraud losses noted that in one
month their "800" number usage jumped from 100 calls to over 10,000,
and their international calls jumped from a few hours per month to
"thousands" of hours. Their long distance carrier, AT&T, did not inform
them of any problem; the victimized company learned of the fraud when

174. Thomas K. Crowe, Companies at Riskfrom Toll Fraud, CORP. LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 1993, at 39.
175. Joe Cantelupe, $82,000 Phone Bill Has Shrill Ring At Health Center, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., April 15, 1995, at B 1.
176. Id.
177. AT&T v. Jiffy Lube Intl., Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 (D. Md.) (citing
Chartways Technologies, Inc. v. AT&T Communications, 6 F.C.C.R. 2852 (1991 )).
178. See generally Businesses Pay for Toll Fraud, TELECOMM. ALERT, Feb. 5, 1996,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NWLTRS File.
179. REP. ON AT&T, supra note 129, at 2.
180. Thomas K. Crowe, Long Distance Services Theft: Who Pays?, NAT. L. J., Oct.
19, 1992, at 19.
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they received the bill. 181 Similarly, the manufacturers of PBX equipment can prevent fraud, by building security functions into the PBX
equipment and teaching customers to use these functions, and by alerting
customers to potential risks concerning the equipment which they
otherwise might not be made aware. Because long distance companies
and PBX equipment manufacturers face little liability risk, however, they
have little incentive to take these prudent steps. 182
Like the law of telecommunications toll fraud, the Utah Digital
Signature Act places a significant risk of liability on a subscriber/customer, with the rationale that the subscriber is best positioned to
prevent fraud (by safeguarding the subscriber's private key) and thus will
have the appropriate incentives to do so. In the toll fraud arena, the
liability standard imposed on customers is strict liability. Under the
Utah Digital Signature Act, the standard imposed on subscribers is,
ostensibly, a negligence standard. As discussed supra, however, the
burden on a subscriber who is attacking a fraudulently signed digital
document is an onerous one. If a hacker breaks into a subscriber's
computer system, gains access to a subscriber's private key, and creates
a large number of facially valid but fraudulent electronic documents, that
subscriber will face enormous practical hurdles in challenging those
electronic documents. Thus, for many subscribers, particularly those
who lack the resources necessary to pursue their rights in court, the Utah
Act imposes a de facto strict liability standard.
The telecommunications toll fraud model is effective as an analogy for
a public key infrastructure in some respects because it introduces an
actor who is ignored in the Utah Act and in the credit card model and
notary model considered supra: the equipment manufacturer. The
hardware and software used to create digital signatures is a critical weak
point in the framework of a public key infrastructure. While the Utah
Act empowers the Division of Corporations and Corporate Code to
"review software for use in creating digital signatures and publish reports
concerning software," 183 the Act is otherwise silent on the issue of the
duties of equipment manufacturers.
Cryptographic algorithms are at the core of a public key infrastructure.
For these algorithms to fulfill their promise, it is absolutely essential that
18\. Complaints on Toll Fraud Aired at FCC En Banc Hearing, COMM. DAILY,
Oct. 13, 1992, at I, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NWLTRS File.
I 82. See supra note 129.
183. § 46-3-104(3)(c). The 1995 version of the Act empowered the Division to
"approve asymmetric cryptosystems for use in signing certificates issued by licensed
certification authorities," and to issue rules addressing the "suitability of algorithms for
use in fulfilling the requirements of this chapter." UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 46-3-501(4), 501(5)(c) (Supp. 1995) (repealed 1996).
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they be implemented correctly. This is not an easy task. For example,
the Netscape Navigator World Wide Web browser uses the RSA public
key algorithm for encryption. A criminal who wanted to decrypt a
message encrypted using Netscape's system and who didn't have the key
would, theoretically, need a supercomputer and thousands of years in
order to decipher it. However, in September of 1995, two Berkeley
graduate students discovered a flaw in Netscape's implementation of the
RSA algorithm, which allowed them to decrypt encrypted messages in
a matter of seconds. 184 Similarly, in March of 1996 a security flaw in
the Java programming language was announced, a flaw which would
allow an attacker to surreptitiously add and remove data from the
computers of visitors to a Web site which exploited the flaw. 185 This
flaw conceivably would allow a criminal to capture a visitor's private
key, as described in the Susan/Irving hypothetical, supra. A theoretical
virus-born attack on the private keys of PGP users has been announced
on the Cypherpunks mailing list. 186 The implementation of cryptographic algorithms is a difficult and risky process. 187
The liability allocations of the Utah Act can be subject to the same
criticism that has been directed at the liability rules embodied in the law
of toll fraud. Subscribers bear an immense amount of risk under the
Utah Act. If electronic documents are fraudulently signed with a
subscriber's digital signature, that subscriber faces a substantial
possibility that he or she will bear any resulting loss. To some degree,
a subscriber can prevent fraud by taking steps to safeguard the subscriber's private key. However, a private key can be discovered in ways that
are totally outside the control of a subscriber. Generating key pairs, for

184. Bill Orr, The Netscape Debacle: Healthy Wakeup Call? AM. BANKERS Ass'N
BANKING J., November 1995, at 74. See also Levy, supra note 21.
185. Don Clark, Researchers Find Big Security Flaw in Java Language, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 26, I 996, at B4.
I 86. E-mail message from Bill Frantz to C. Bradford Biddle (Feb. 22, I 996)
(describing PGP attack developed by Frantz and noting that a description of the attack
had been posted to the Cypherpunks list, archived at <http://www.hks.net/cpunks/>)
(printed copy on file with author). For general information about PGP, see GARFINKEL,
supra note 52. For more information about the Cypherpunks, an informally-organized
group dedicated to defending privacy with cryptography, anonymous electronic mail
forwarding systems, digital signatures, and electronic currency, visit the list archives.
187. Another example of the difficulties inherent in implementing encryption
schemes can be found in First Virtual Holdings Identifies Major Flaw in Software-Based
Encryption of Credit Cards; Numbers Easily Captured by Automated Program, PR
NEWSWIRE, February 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, NWLTRS File.
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example, is a notoriously tricky process. If the hardware or software
used to generate key pairs is flawed, private keys could be easily
discovered. 188 In the context of toll fraud, one toll fraud victim said
"PBX owners should not be responsible for I 00 percent of the toll fraud
if we don't control 100 percent of our destiny." 189 The same principle
applies in a public key infrastructure. The heavy burden of liability
which the Utah Act places on subscribers is inappropriate in light of the
fact that there is a substantial likelihood of fraud occurring which is not
the result of a subscribers negligence, but instead based on faulty
hardware or software. Some measure of liability risk should explicitly
be placed on hardware and software providers in order to ensure that
adequate care is taken to prevent this sort of fraud.

D.

A Proposal Based on Unenacted Toll Fraud Reforms

The law of telecommunications toll fraud has been roundly criticized,
and reform efforts have been launched on several fronts. In 1993, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) designed to address toll fraud problems.190 This rulemaking effort appears to have stalled. In 1992, the
Telephone Toll Fraud Remedies Act (TTFRA) was introduced in
Congress. 191 The TTFRA was not enacted, but it nonetheless provides
an instructive alternative to liability allocation in the world of toll fraud,
and thus can serve as a model for liability allocation in a public key
infrastructure.
The TTFRA was designed to achieve two purposes: (1) to prevent toll
fraud by requiring PBX equipment makers and sellers to adequately
warn customers about the possibility of toll fraud, inform customers
about the appropriate precautions to take to prevent such fraud, and alert
customers to the risk of financial exposure they assume when purchasing
PBX equipment; and, (2) to provide a mechanism for adjudicating toll
fraud liability disputes. 192 The TTFRA provided that disputes involving allegations of toll fraud be subject to arbitration at the option of a

188. See supra notes 21 and 183.
189. REP. ON AT&T, supra note 129.
190. Policies and Rules Concerning Toll Fraud, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,153 (1993)
(proposed Dec. 13, 1993). Among other things, this NPRM noted that the FCC had
"tentatively concluded that carrier tariff provisions that historically have placed strict
liability on customers that are victims of toll fraud without acknowledging any obligation
by the carriers to warn customers of risks of using carrier services are unreasonable."
Id. at 65,154.
191. H.R. 6066, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
192. Id.§ 3.
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customer (and not at the expense of the customer). 193 The Act emphasizes timely resolution of disputes. 194 The arbitration would involve
the customer, the common carrier, and the equipment manufacturer or
dealer. 195 The TTFRA called upon the FCC to develop security
guidelines for use by customers in guarding their PBX equipment. 196
Presumably a customer who adhered to these guidelines would avoid
liability for negligence. If a customer was found to be negligent, they
would be held liable for the loss caused by the fraud. The TTFRA is
silent concerning burdens of proof and sufficiency of evidence.
Many of the principles of the TTFRA can be applied in the context of
a public key infrastructure. The Act's emphasis on adequate warnings
certainly translates to the realm of digital signatures. Subscribers must
be informed by their hardware or software provider about steps that they
should take to adequately protect their private keys, and must be
informed about the liability exposure that they face when participating
in a public key infrastructure.
The TTFRA's dispute resolution
mechanism may translate to the world of digital signatures as well.
Subscribers who challenge a digital signature as fraudulent could have
the opportunity to immediately appeal to an arbitrator or "expert agency"
with expertise in electronic transactions. If that subscriber can show that
they did not affix the digital signature in question (the evidentiary
burden here should certainly be lower than "clear and convincing
evidence") and that they adhered to clearly articulated guidelines in
protecting their private key, then that subscriber should not bear the full
brunt of the loss.
The recipient of a facially valid digitally-signed document should not
necessarily fully bear the loss either; otherwise, reliance on digitallysigned documents will be chilled and the benefits of a public key
infrastructure lost. Instead, the arbitrator could apportion the loss
between the hardware/software provider, the repository, the certification
authority, and the subscriber, depending on relative degree of fault. If
a software system is cracked, for example, enabling the fraud, then the
software provider should be liable. Likewise if a CA or a repository
causes a loss, they should be responsible.

193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 4(b)(6), 4(b)(6)(B).
§ 4(d).
§ 4(b)(6).
§ 4(b )(3 ).
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One difficult question arises when no entity is clearly at fault; that is,
when subscriber, CA, recipient, software/hardware provider, and
repository all perform as well as can reasonably be expected, and yet a
loss still occurs. In such a situation the loss should fall on the recipient,
the party that chose to rely on the fraudulent digitally signed message.
This party is best able to assess the risks associated with relying on any
particular message. If the potential risk of loss is high, this party can
make "out of band" contacts (i.e., telephone or in-person contacts) with
the ostensible sender to obtain assurances about the authenticity of the
message, or can choose not to rely on the message at all.
Another difficult question arises when a consumer-subscriber, after
being provided specific, understandable guidelines concerning how to
protect his or her private key, fails to comply with those guidelines,
resulting in a substantial loss. Having a consumer bear potentially
unlimited liability does not comport with the policy of consumer
protection embodied in the EFTA and Truth in Lending Act. Furthermore, consumers may not choose to participate in the infrastructure if
they are potentially subject to unlimited liability, although the force of
this argument is reduced if the guidelines with which a consumer must
comply in order to avoid liability are clear and reasonable (thus making
the risk of unlimited liability low). Perhaps the best approach in this
scenario is to simply cap consumer liability, even for negligent failure
to comply with the applicable guidelines, at a fixed amount in a fashion
similar to the EFTA. The amount should be much higher than the $50
limit in the EFTA-perhaps $1000----or perhaps could be tiered based on
the degree of fault-i.e., $500 for "ordinary negligence," $2500 for
"gross negligence," $5000 for "recklessness" and no limit for intentional
wrongs. While this approach will potentially impose unreimbursed
losses on parties who rely on digital signatures, presumably parties
would take this into account in their risk-benefit calculus when choosing
to rely on a digital signature. In a large dollar transaction, the relying
party may choose to obtain out of band assurances. In a small dollar
transaction, the relying party may simply choose to accept this risk of
loss.
Insurance should eventually address the problem of unreimbursed
losses. A private insurance market will not develop immediately,
however, because of the lack of a pattern of loss experience and other
factors. 197 In the meantime, the proposal outlined above could provide
parties participating in a public key infrastructure with a reasonable

197.
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degree of certainty, enabling them to make rational economic choices,
without abandoning the policy of consumer protection.

E.

A Liability Cap for Certification Authorities?

Turning back to the public key infrastructure actually implemented by
the Utah Digital Signature Act, a final criticism of the Act's liability
provisions is in order. The Utah Act provides a de facto liability cap for
certification authorities, which under easily-envisioned circumstances
will preclude complete recovery for numerous innocent defrauded
parties. This policy decision will undermine the integrity of the
infrastructure the Act is designed to promote.
It is easy to envision a scenario in which a CA's private key is
compromised. One way that this could occur is through brute force
cryptanalysis: a "factoring attack." 198 That is, a criminal could simply
dedicate the immense amount of computing power needed and "break"
the underlying algorithm, discovering a CA's private key from an
analysis of the CA's public key. Alternatively, a criminal could
threaten, blackmail, or torture an employee of the certification authority,
forcing the employee to surrender the CA's private key, a process
described as "rubber hose cryptanalysis." 199 The criminal could bribe
a CA employee: a "purchase-key attack."200 An incompetent employee could simply reveal the key accidentally. A flaw in the hardware and
software utilized by the CA could be discovered and exploited.
The compromise of a CA private key could be catastrophic. A
publication from RSA Laboratories notes that "[i]t is extremely

198. At the risk of immensely oversimplifying the issue, the mathematical premise
behind public key cryptography is that it is easy to multiply two prime numbers to get
a third number, but it is very difficult to "factor" that third number and recover those
two primes. Generating a key pair involves multiplying two large primes. Figuring out
a private key from a public key involves factoring a large number. If the number (or
"key length") is large enough (i.e., 300 digits or more), one expert estimates it would
take more than $300 trillion in computing resources to determine a private key from a
public key. SCHNEIER, E-MAIL SECURITY, supra note 7, 45-46, 49. Public key
cryptographic algorithms are often implemented with relatively short key lengths
because of export restriction imposed by the U.S. Government, however, and can be
broken through a "brute-force" attack. See Levy , supra note 21, at 134, 196-200
(describing the successful effort to break the export version of Netscape Navigator's 40bit encryption key).
199. SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, supra note 7, at 7.
200. Id.
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important that private keys of certifying authorities are stored securely
because compromise would enable undetectable forgeries." 201
A
criminal who discovers the private key of a certification authority could
produce an unlimited number of ostensibly valid certificates. The
criminal could enter into fraudulent transactions under a host of assumed
names, or could create certificates in the name or particular individuals
or corporations and impersonate those individuals or corporations
electronically. Moreover, once a CA's private key was compromised
and the corresponding public key revoked, all certificates issued by that
CA would be invalid. All of the subscribers who utilized that CA would
be forced to obtain new certificates. 202 The costs associated with a
compromised CA key dramatically outweigh the costs associated with
a compromised subscriber key.
A criminal with a certification authority's private key could cause an
immense amount of financial damage, imposing huge losses on a number
of innocent parties. These innocent parties would be unable to recover
their full losses from a negligent certification authority if the total of
these losses was greater than the amount of that certification authority's
"suitable guaranty." A suitable guaranty is either a surety bond or an
irrevocable letter of credit that meets certain administrative specifications203 and is designed to facilitate recovery of any judgment obtained
against a CA. The Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code
is empowered to determine an amount appropriate for a suitable guaranty
in a rulemaking proceeding, in light of the burden a suitable guaranty
places upon licensed certification authorities and the assurance of
financial responsibility it provides to persons who rely on certificates
issued by licensed certification authorities. 204 The Act states that "[a]

201. RSA FAQ, supra note 7, § 3.8.
202. Id. § 3.10.
203. § 46-3-103(34)(a).
204. § 46-3-104(3)(b). The 1995 version of the Utah Act did not delegate this
power to the rulemaking process, and instead set out a formula for calculating the
amount of a suitable guaranty in the statute itself. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3103(34)(A)(II) (Supp. 1995) (repealed 1996) provided that the amount of the suitable
guaranty be the greater of either (a) I 00% of the largest recommended reliance limit of
any certificate issued by a certification authority, or (b) 35% of the total recommended
reliance limits of all certificates issued by a certification authority. Recommended
reliance limits are dollar figures specified in a certificate which indicate the certification
authority's liability and financial responsibility limits in transactions using that certificate.
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 46-3-103(26) (Supp. 1995) (repealed 1996); 1996 Utah Laws§ 463-103(28). This issue was discussed at the October 3, 1995 meeting of the Utah Digital
Signature Legislative Facilitation Committee. The minutes to this meeting note:
The definition of "suitable guaranty" was discussed extensively. Mr. [David
W.] Moore [representing Utah Title and Escrow School] stated that the cost
of the bond or letter of credit required by the suitable guaranty provision may
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suitable guaranty may also provide that the total annual liability on the
guaranty to all persons making claims based on it may not exceed the
face amount of the guaranty."205 Financial institutions acting as
certification authorities are exempted from the requirement of posting a
suitable guaranty. 206
If a defrauded subscriber obtains a judgment against a certification
authority, they can recover that judgment plus attorney's fees from the
CA's suitable guaranty. 207 However, the total liability on the suitable
guaranty to all persons making claims upon it cannot exceed the amount
of the suitable guaranty. 208 Thus, in the easily-envisioned scenario of
widespread fraud caused by a CA's compromised private key, defrauded
subscribers may not be able to recover the full amount of their losses
from the negligent CA. The CA's liability is effectively capped at the
amount of their suitable guaranty. All of the defrauded subscribers may
be able to obtain judgments against the CA. However, no rational
businessperson entering the CA business would organize the business in
such a manner as to create liability exposure beyond that required by the
suitable guaranty. The CA will do business in a corporate form which
will make the CA essentially judgment-proof in the event of catastrophic
widespread fraud based on a compromised private key.209 There are
no other financial responsibility provisions in the Utah Act, and thus the
suitable guaranty will serve as a liability cap.
The risk of a compromised certification authority private key is a very
serious risk in a public key infrastructure. Because the rewards from
eliminate title companies from the market since their product guarantees the
validity of a mortgage. He suggested setting a less onerous standard by
Administrative Rule. Mr. [Alan] Asay [representing the Utah Division of
Corporations] . . . stated that the percentages expressed in this Subsection are
not based on industry track records because no such record exists . . . . Mr.
Asay suggested amending the suitable guaranty amount to half of what is
currently stated in the law. Mr. [Michael] Wims [of the Utah Attorney
General's Office] made a motion that the amount of the bond or letter of credit
be established by Administrative Rule. This motion passed unanimously.
Minutes of The Utah Digital Signatures Act Legislation Facilitation Committee (October
3, 1995) (copy on file with author).
205. § 46-3-103(34)(b).
206. § 46-3-103(34)(c).
207. § 46-3-310. It is unclear whether a subscriber could collect attorney's fees in
an action against a financial institution serving as a CA.
208. § 46-3-310(2).
209. For a summary of how the corporate form can serve to limit liability, see
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS§§ 13.6, 13.8 (1989).
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successfully obtaining a CA's private key could be great, criminals will
likely expend considerable resources trying to obtain the private keys of
CAs. CAs must guard their private keys with extreme vigilance.
Capping the CA's liability when the CA negligently discloses their
private key is an undesirable public policy. If a certification authority
does not have to potentially bear the full costs of any losses resulting
from a compromised private key, they may not have the incentive to
take expensive precautions to protect against that occurrence.210
The rationale of the drafters of the Utah Act in limiting the liability
of CAs is, presumably, to foster development of a certification authority
industry. 211 Assuming that this is a worthy goal, capping CAs'
liability does not accomplish it effectively. 212 As noted, CAs will not
have adequate incentives to take expensive precautions to protect their
private key. Moreover, the CA who is negligent will be able to
externalize the costs of their negligence onto otherwise innocent
defrauded subscribers and other parties. A more sensible approach
would be to require all CAs to insure against this type of catastrophe.
The discipline of an insurance market would promote appropriate
investment on the part of the CAs in light of the relevant risk.
A private insurance market may not develop immediately,213 although faced with the prospect of numerous CAs required to purchase
expensive insurance coverage it is certainly possible that a competitive
insurance industry could quickly develop an appropriate insurance
package. In the meantime, perhaps the state could temporarily act as an
insurer, creating an insurance pool from proceeds collected from all CAs.
The passage of digital signature legislation indicates that state legislatures have determined that the development of a public key infrastructure
is beneficial to the public. The perceived benefits of a public key
infrastructure may warrant state involvement to promote the development
of a private sector insurance pool, in order to maximize preventative
steps taken to avoid a serious risk, and to guarantee recovery for
innocent public key infrastructure participants in the event of CA
negligence.

210. See generally Calabresi, supra note 152.
211. See, e.g., UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW, supra note I, at 58: "As with any
other business enterprise, a certification authority must be able to assess and manage its
risk of exposure to potential liability, and one of the principal impediments to the
emergence of certification authorities has been the uncertainty of the legal risks such a
business would undertake."
212. The liability cap imposed by the Utah Act can be criticized as a subsidy
designed to foster development of a favored industry. See generally MORTON J.
HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERJCAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977).
213. BAUM, supra note 138, at 338.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The liability provisions of the Utah Digital Signature Act create an
attractive legal environment for the entrepreneur contemplating a
business as a certification authority. If a CA complies with explicitly
defined rules, they enter a safe harbor, sheltered from liability. Even if
the CA fails to comply with these rules and negligently imposes losses
on large numbers of subscribers, the CA enjoys a de facto liability cap.
The drafters of the Utah Act evidently believe that, with legal risks so
clearly defined, entrepreneurs will rush to enter the CA market, creating
a public key infrastructure, which, presumably, will benefit all who
participate in it. This view must be questioned. Consumers who
participate in the infrastructure developed under the Utah Act subject
themselves to extensive liability risk compared to a variety of analogous
situations, and face difficult evidentiary burdens in resolving disputes
which arise under the Act. Consumers will not participate in a system
that subjects them to such dramatic risks. Moreover, by limiting the
liability of CAs to an amount which is less than the actual damages a
certification authority can cause, the economic integrity of the infrastructure is weakened. The Utah Digital Signature Act manifests misplaced
priorities. Promoting the development of a public key infrastructure is
a worthwhile goal. However, it should not be accomplished by
abandoning the policy of consumer protection embodied in the EFTA
and other federal legislation, nor should it be accomplished by encouraging development of a system which allows enterprises to externalize the
costs of their negligence, thus producing a less-than-robust infrastructure.
Indeed, by ignoring the policies of consumer protection and economic
integrity, the Utah Digital Signature Act may ultimately undermine
development of the infrastructure that the Act is ostensibly designed to
promote.
C. BRADFORD BIDDLE
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